# LANGUAGE translation of https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/economics_frank/frank.html # Copyright (C) YEAR Free Software Foundation, Inc. # This file is distributed under the same license as the original article. # FIRST AUTHOR , YEAR. # #, fuzzy msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: frank.html\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2024-01-01 05:26+0000\n" "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n" "Last-Translator: FULL NAME \n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE \n" "Language: \n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" #. type: Content of: msgid "" "Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation? - GNU Project - Free Software " "Foundation" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h2> msgid "Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><address> msgid "by Robert H. Frank, Thomas Gilovich, and Dennis T. Regan" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "In an essay written in 1879, Francis Amasa Walker tried to explain " "“why economists tend to be in bad odor amongst real people.” " "Walker, who went on to become the first president of the American Economic " "Association, argued that it was partly because economists disregard " "“…the customs and beliefs that tie individuals to their " "occupations and locations and lead them to act in ways contrary to the " "predictions of economic theory.”" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "More than a century later, the general public continues to regard economists " "with suspicion. This attitude stems in part from an apparent " "misunderstanding of economists' positions on important public policy " "issues. For example, economists commonly advocate auctioning rights to " "discharge atmospheric pollutants to the highest bidders, leading critics to " "bemoan economists' “shocking disregard for the environment and lack of " "compassion for the poor.” What else, the critics ask, could enable " "them to support a program under which “the rich can pollute to their " "heart's content?” On closer examination, however, the economist's " "position is less hostile to the interests of the poor and the environment " "than it appears. Indeed, as almost every economics student now knows, the " "effect of auctioning pollution rights is to concentrate the burden of " "pollution reduction in the hands not of the poor but of those people and " "firms who can reduce pollution at the lowest cost. And this is an outcome " "that is clearly in the interests of all citizens, rich and poor alike." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Misunderstandings of this sort aside, there remains another important source " "of public skepticism toward economics — namely, the perception that " "economics encourages people to act selfishly in pursuit of their own " "material interests. In this paper, we examine the validity of this " "perception." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h3> msgid "Economists and the Self-Interest Model" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "If pressed, most economists will concede that people sometimes care about " "more than just their own material well being. Many have concerns for the " "welfare of other people, for esthetics, for their duties as citizens, and so " "on." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Yet few economists include these broader concerns in their models of human " "behavior. It may well be that the unpaid volunteer who heads the local " "United Way Campaign is driven purely by his concern for the disadvantaged; " "but economists feel on much firmer ground if they can identify some more " "narrowly self-interested motive for his action. And on inspection, there is " "at least some evidence in support of their cynicism. When we examine the " "membership rolls of volunteer organizations, we find that insurance brokers, " "real estate agents, car dealers, chiropractors, and others with something to " "sell tend to be disproportionately represented. Such organizations have " "less than their share of truck drivers and postal employees." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "The self-interest model has well established explanatory power. Whatever " "role love may play in the sustenance of marriage relationships, we know that " "divorce rates are higher in states that provide liberal welfare benefits. " "When energy prices rise, people are more likely to form car pools and to " "insulate their houses. When the opportunity cost of time rises, people have " "fewer children. And so on. From the economist's perspective, motives other " "than self-interest may matter, but they are peripheral to the main thrust of " "human endeavor, and we indulge them at our peril. In Gordon Tullock's " "words, “the average human being is about 95 percent selfish in the " "narrow sense of the term.”" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "From its base in economics, the self-interest model has made strong inroads " "into a variety of other disciplines. Psychologists, political scientists, " "sociologists, philosophers, game theorists, biologists, and others rely " "increasingly on this model to explain and predict human behavior." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "The basic question we investigate in this paper is whether exposure to the " "self-interest model alters the extent to which people behave in " "self-interested ways. The paper is organized into two parts. In the first, " "we report the results of a series of empirical studies — some our own, " "some by other investigators — that support the hypothesis that " "economists behave in more self-interested ways. By itself, this evidence " "does not demonstrate that exposure to the self-interest model is the " "<i>cause</i> of more self-interested behavior, although, as we will see, a " "case can be made for this proposition on a priori grounds. An alternative " "interpretation is that economists may simply have been more self-interested " "to begin with, and this difference was one reason they chose to study " "economics. In the second part of the paper, we present preliminary evidence " "that exposure to the self-interest model does in fact increase " "self-interested behavior." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h4> msgid "I. Do Economists Behave Differently?" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h5> msgid "A. The Free-Rider Experiments" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "One of the clearest predictions of the self-interest model is that people " "will tend to free-ride on the efforts of others when it comes to the " "provision of public or collective goods. Even people who would strongly " "benefit from having, say, higher program quality on public TV have little " "incentive to contribute. After all, any single individual's contribution is " "far too small to alter the likelihood of achieving the desired outcome." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "A study by Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames found that students of economics are " "indeed much more likely to free-ride in experiments that called for private " "contributions to public goods. Their basic experiment involved a group of " "subjects who were given an initial endowment of money, which they were to " "allocate between two accounts, one “public,” the other " "“private.” Money deposited in a subject's private account was " "returned dollar for dollar to the subject at the end of the experiment. " "Money deposited in the public account was first pooled, then multiplied by " "some factor greater than one, and then distributed equally among all " "subjects." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Under these circumstances, the socially optimal behavior is for each subject " "to put her entire endowment in the public account. But the individually " "most advantageous strategy is to put all of it in the private account. The " "self-interest model predicts that all subjects will follow the latter " "strategy. Most don't. Across eleven replications of the experiment, the " "average contribution to the public account was approximately 49 percent." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "It was only in a twelfth replication with first-year graduate students in " "economics as subjects that Marwell and Ames obtained results more nearly " "consistent with the self-interest model. These subjects contributed an " "average of only 20 percent of their initial endowments to the public " "account, a figure significantly less than the corresponding figure for " "noneconomists (p<.05)." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "On completion of each replication of the experiment, Marwell and Ames asked " "their subjects two followup questions:" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><ol><li> msgid "What is a “fair” investment in the public good?" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><ol><li> msgid "" "Are you concerned about “fairness” in making your investment " "decision?" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "In response to the first question, 75 percent of the noneconomists answered " "“half or more” of the endowment, and 25 percent answered " "“all.” In response to question 2, almost all noneconomists " "answered “yes.” The corresponding responses of the economics " "graduate students were much more difficult to summarize. As Marwell and " "Ames wrote," msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><blockquote><p> msgid "" "… More than one-third of the economists either refused to answer the " "question regarding what is fair, or gave very complex, uncodable responses. " "It seems that the meaning of ‘fairness’ in this context was " "somewhat alien for this group. Those who did respond were much more likely " "to say that little or no contribution was ‘fair.’ In addition, " "the economics graduate students were about half as likely as other subjects " "to indicate that they were ‘concerned with fairness’ in making " "their decisions." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "The Marwell and Ames study can be criticized on the grounds that their " "noneconomist control groups consisted of high school students and college " "undergraduates, who differ in a variety of ways from first-year graduate " "students in any discipline. Perhaps the most obvious difference is age. As " "we will see, however, criticism based on the age difference is blunted by " "our own evidence that older students generally give greater weight to social " "concerns like the ones that arise in free-rider experiments. It remains " "possible, however, that more mature students might have had a more " "sophisticated understanding of the nuances and ambiguities inherent in " "concepts like fairness, and for that reason gave less easily coded responses " "to the followup questions." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Yet another concern with the Marwell and Ames experiments is not easily " "dismissed. Although the authors do not report the sex composition of their " "group of economics graduate students, such groups are almost always " "preponderantly male. The authors' control groups of high school and " "undergraduate students, by contrast, consisted equally of males and " "females. As our own evidence will later show, there is a sharp tendency for " "males to behave less cooperatively in experiments of this sort. So while " "the Marwell and Ames findings are suggestive, they do not clearly establish " "that economists behave differently." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h5> msgid "B. Economists and the Ultimatum Bargaining Game" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "The other major study of whether economists behave differently from members " "of other disciplines is by John Carter and Michael Irons (1991). These " "authors measured the self-interestedness of economists by examining their " "behavior in the ultimatum bargaining game. This is a simple game with two " "players, an “allocator” and a “receiver.” The " "allocator is given a sum of money (in these experiments, $10), and must then " "propose how to divide this sum between herself and the receiver. Suppose, " "for example, the allocator proposes $X for herself, the remaining $(10-X) " "for the receiver. Once the allocator makes this proposal, the receiver has " "two choices: (1) he may accept, in which case each player gets the amount " "proposed by the allocator; or (2) he may refuse, in which case each player " "gets zero. The game is played only once by the same partners." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "If both players behave according to the self-interest model, the model makes " "an unequivocal prediction about how the game will proceed. Assuming the " "money cannot be divided into units smaller than one cent, the allocator will " "propose $9.99 for herself and the remaining $0.01 for the receiver, and the " "receiver will accept on the grounds that a penny is better than nothing. " "Since the game will not be repeated, there is no point in the receiver " "turning down a low offer in the hope of generating a better offer in the " "future." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Other researchers have shown that the strategy predicted by the " "self-interest model is almost never followed in practice: 50-50 splits are " "the most common outcome, and most one-sided offers are rejected out of " "concerns about fairness." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "The research strategy employed by Carter and Irons was to compare the " "performance of economics majors and other students and see which group came " "closer to the predictions of the self-interest model. In a sample of 43 " "economics majors, the average minimum amount acceptable by the receiver was " "$1.70, as compared with an average of $2.44 for a sample of 49 noneconomics " "majors (p<.05). As receivers then, economics majors came significantly " "closer than nonmajors to the behavior predicted by the self-interest model." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "In the allocator's role as well, economics majors performed more in " "accordance with the predictions of the self-interest model than did " "nonmajors. Economics proposed to keep an average of $6.15 for themselves, " "as compared to an average of only $5.44 for the sample of 49 nonmajors " "(p<.01)." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) report findings similar to those of " "Carter and Irons: commerce students (the term used to describe business " "students in Canadian universities) were more likely than psychology students " "to make one-sided offers in ultimatum bargaining games." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "One difficulty with the Carter and Irons results is that the way they " "assigned the allocator and receiver roles leaves open possible differences " "in the interpretation of what behavior is required in the name of fairness. " "In particular, allocators earned their role by having achieved higher scores " "on a preliminary word game. Allocators might thus reason that they were " "entitled to a greater share of the surplus on the strength of their earlier " "performance. The observed differences in the behavior of economics majors " "and nonmajors might therefore be ascribed to a differential tendency to " "attach significance to the earlier performance differences. The training " "received by economics students in the marginal productivity theory of wages " "lends at least surface plausibility to this interpretation." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "To summarize the existing literature, both the Marwell and Ames and Carter " "and Irons papers provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that " "economists tend to behave less cooperatively than noneconomists. But " "because of the specific experimental design problems mentioned, neither " "study is conclusive. In the following sections we describe our own attempts " "to test the hypothesis that economists behave less cooperatively." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h5> msgid "C. Survey Data on Charitable Giving" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "The central role of the free-rider hypothesis in modern economic theory " "suggests that economists might be less likely than others to make gifts to " "private charities. To explore this possibility, we mailed questionnaires to " "1245 college professors randomly chosen from the professional directories of " "23 disciplines, asking them to report the annual dollar amounts they gave to " "a variety of private charities. We received 576 responses with sufficient " "detail for inclusion in our study. Respondents were grouped into the " "following disciplines: economics (N 75); other social sciences (N 106); " "math, computer science, and engineering (N 48); natural sciences (N 98); " "humanities (N 94); architecture, art, and music (N 68); and professional (N " "87). Members of every discipline, even economics, fell far short of the " "prediction of the strong version of the free-rider hypothesis. But the " "proportion of pure free riders among economists (that is, those who reported " "giving no money to any charity) was more than double that of any of the " "other six areas included in the survey. (See Figure 1.)" msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 1" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "<strong>Figure 1. Proportion of Pure Free Riders in Seven Disciplines. " "</strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Although we do not have data on the gender of each survey respondent, gender " "differences by discipline do not appear to account for the pattern of " "free-ridership shown in Figure 1. For example, the natural sciences, which " "are also preponderantly male, had only one-third as many free riders as did " "economics." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Despite their generally higher incomes, economists were also among the least " "generous in terms of their median gifts to large charities like " "viewer-supported television and the United Way, which are shown in Figures 2 " "and 3, respectively." msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 2" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "<strong>Figure 2. Median Gift to Public Television. </strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 3" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "<strong>Figure 3. Median Gift to the United Way. </strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "In fairness to the self-interest model, we should note that there may be " "self-interested reasons for contributing even in the case of charities like " "the United Way and public television. United Way campaigns, for example, " "are usually organized in the workplace and there is often considerable " "social pressure to contribute. Public television fund drives often make " "on-the-air announcements of donors' names and economists stand to benefit " "just as much as the members of any other discipline from being hailed as " "community-minded citizens. In the case of smaller, more personal charitable " "organizations, there are often even more compelling self-interested reasons " "for giving. After all, failure to contribute in accordance with one's " "financial ability may mean outright exclusion from the substantial private " "benefits associated with membership in religious groups, fraternal " "organizations, and the like." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "An examination of economists' gifts to other charities revealed that their " "median annual gift is actually slightly larger, in absolute terms, than the " "median for all disciplines taken as a whole. But because economists have " "significantly higher salaries than do the members of most other disciplines, " "these data, like the data shown in Figures 2 and 3, tend to overstate the " "relative generosity of economists. Unfortunately, we do not have direct " "income measures for the respondents in our survey, but we do have the number " "of years each respondent has been a practitioner in his or her discipline. " "In an attempt to take income effects into account, we estimated earnings " "functions (salary vs. years of experience) for each discipline using data " "from a large private university. We then applied the estimated coefficients " "from these earnings functions to the experience data from our survey to " "impute an income estimate for each respondent in our survey. Finally, we " "used these imputed income figures, together with our respondents' reports of " "their total charitable giving to estimate the relationship between income " "and total giving shown in Figure 4. In the latter exercise, all economists " "were dropped from the sample on the grounds that our object was to see " "whether the giving pattern of economists deviates from the pattern we see " "for other disciplines." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Thus, for example, in Figure 4 we see that a noneconomist with an annual " "income of $44,000 (roughly, the median imputed income for architects in our " "sample) is expected to give almost $900 per year to charity, while a " "noneconomist with an income of $62,000 (roughly the median imputed income " "for economists in our sample) is expected to give more than $1400 per year." msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 4" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "<strong>Figure 4. Charitable Giving vs. Imputed Income. </strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Using the relationship between charitable giving and income, we calculated " "the expected gift for each respondent as a function of his or her imputed " "income. We then calculated our measure of a discipline's generosity as the " "ratio of the average value of gifts actually reported by members of the " "discipline to the average value of gifts expected on the basis of the " "members' imputed incomes. A discipline is thus more generous than expected " "if this ratio exceeds 1.0, and less generous if it is less than 1.0. The " "computed ratio for economists was 0.91, which means that economists in our " "sample gave 91 percent as much as they would have been expected to give on " "the basis of their imputed incomes. The performance of economists by this " "measure is compared with the performance of other disciplines in Figure 5." msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 5" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "<strong>Figure 5. The Ratio of Average Gift to Gift Expected on the Basis of " "Income. </strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "On a number of other dimensions covered in our survey, the behavior of " "economists was little different from the behavior of members of other " "disciplines. For example, economists were only marginally less likely than " "members of other disciplines to report that they would take costly " "administrative action to prosecute a student suspected of cheating. " "Economists were actually slightly above average for the entire sample in " "terms of the numbers of hours they reportedly spend in “volunteer " "activities.” In terms of their reported frequency of voting in " "presidential elections, economists were only slightly below the sample " "average." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h5> msgid "D. Economists and the Prisoner's Dilemma" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "In this section we report our results from a large experimental study of how " "economics majors and nonmajors perform in the prisoner's dilemma game." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Table 1 shows the monetary payoffs in dollars to two players, X and Y, in a " "standard prisoner's dilemma. In Table 1, as in all prisoner's dilemmas, each " "player gets a higher payoff when each cooperates than when each defects. " "But when one player's strategy is fixed, the other player always gets a " "higher payoff by defecting than by cooperating; and hence the dilemma. By " "following individual self-interest, each player does worse than if each had " "cooperated." msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Table 1" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "<strong>Table 1. Monetary Payoffs for a Prisoner's Dilemma Game. </strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "One of the most celebrated and controversial predictions of the " "self-interest model is that people will always defect in one-shot prisoner's " "dilemmas. The game thus provides an opportunity to examine the extent to " "which various groups exhibit self-interested behavior. Accordingly, we " "conducted a large one-shot prisoner's dilemma experiment involving both " "economics majors and nonmajors. Many of our subjects were students " "recruited from courses in which the prisoner's dilemma is an item on the " "syllabus. Others were given a detailed briefing about the game." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Our subjects met in groups of three and each was told that he would play the " "game once with each of the other two subjects. The payoff matrix, shown in " "Table 1, was the same for each play of the game. Subjects were told that " "the games would be played for real money, and that none of the players would " "learn how their partners had responded in each play of the game. (More " "below on how confidentiality was maintained.)" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Following a period in which subjects were given an opportunity to get to " "know one another, each subject was taken to a separate room and asked to " "fill out a form indicating his response (cooperate or defect) to each of " "the other two players in his group. After the subjects had filled out their " "forms, the results were tallied and the payments disbursed. Each subject " "received a single payment that was the sum of three separate amounts: (1) " "the payoff from the game with the first partner; (2) the payoff from the " "game with the second partner; and (3) a term that was drawn at random from " "a large list of positive and negative values. None of these three elements " "could be observed separately, only their sum." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "The purpose of the random term was to make it impossible for a subject to " "infer from her total payment how any of the other subjects had played. It " "prevented both the possibility of inferring individual choices and also of " "inferring even group patterns of choice. Thus, unlike earlier prisoner's " "dilemma experiments, ours did not enable the subject to infer what happened " "even when each (or neither) of her partners defected." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "In one version of the experiment (the “unlimited” version), " "subjects were told that they could make promises not to defect, but they " "were also told that the anonymity of their responses would render such " "promises unenforceable. In two other versions of the experiment (the " "“intermediate” and “limited” versions), subjects " "were not permitted to make promises about their strategies. The latter two " "versions differed from one another in terms of the length of pre-game " "interaction, with up to 30 minutes permitted for the intermediate groups and " "no more than ten minutes for the limited groups. All groups were given an " "extensive briefing on the prisoner's dilemma at the start of the experiment " "and each subject was required to complete a questionnaire at the end to " "verify that he or she had indeed understood the consequences of different " "combinations of choices." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h6> msgid "Results for the Sample as a Whole" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "For the sample as a whole there were a total of 267 games, which means a " "total of 534 choices between cooperation and defection. The choices for " "economics majors and nonmajors are shown in Figure 6, where we see that the " "defection rate for economics majors was 60.4 percent, as compared to only " "38.8 percent for nonmajors." msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 6" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "<strong>Figure 6. Defection and Cooperation Rates for the Sample as a " "Whole. </strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Needless to say, this pattern of differences is strongly supportive of the " "hypothesis that economics majors are more likely than nonmajors to behave " "self-interestedly (p<.005)." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h6> msgid "Adding Control Variables" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Earlier we noted that one possible explanation for the observed differences " "between economics students and others is that economics students are more " "likely than others to be male. To control for the possible influences of " "sex, age, and experimental condition, we performed the ordinary least " "squares regression reported in Table 2. Because each subject played the " "game twice, the individual responses are not statistically independent. To " "get around this problem, we limited our sample to the 207 subjects who " "either cooperated with, or defected on, each of their two partners. The 60 " "subjects who cooperated with one partner and defected on the other were " "deleted from the sample. The dependent variable is the subject's choice of " "strategy, coded as 0 for “cooperate” and 1 for " "“defect.” The independent variables are “econ” which " "takes the value 1 for economics majors, 0 for all others; " "“unlimited,” which is 1 for subjects in the unlimited version of " "the experiment, 0 for all others; “intermediate,” which is 1 for " "subjects in the intermediate version, 0 for all others; " "“limited,” which is the reference category; “sex,” " "coded as 1 for males, 0 for females; and “class,” coded as 1 for " "freshmen, 2 for sophomores, 3 for juniors, and 4 for seniors." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><caption> msgid "<strong>Dependent variable: own response</strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><caption><small> msgid "<small>R<sup>2</sup> = 22.2%    R<sup>2</sup>(adjusted) = 20.3%" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><caption> msgid "s = 0.4402 with 207 - 6 = 201 degrees of freedom</small>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><th> msgid "Source" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><th> msgid "Sum of Squares" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><th> msgid "df" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><th> msgid "Mean Square" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><th> msgid "F-ratio" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "Regression" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "11.1426" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "5" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "2.229" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "11.5" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "Residual" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "38.9540" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "201" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.193801" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><th> msgid "Variable" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><th> msgid "Coefficient" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><th> msgid "s.e." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><th> msgid "t-ratio" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "Constant" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.579127" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.1041" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "5.57" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "econ" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.168835" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.0780" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "2.16" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "unlimited" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.00" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "—" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "intermediate" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-0.091189" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.0806" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-1.13" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "limited" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-0.329572" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.0728" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-4.53" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "sex" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.239944" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.0642" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "3.74" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "class" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-0.065363" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.0303" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-2.16" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><p> msgid "<strong>Table 2. Whole Sample Regression</strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Consistent with a variety of other findings on sex differences in " "cooperation, we estimate that, other factors the same, the probability of a " "male defecting is almost 0.24 higher than the corresponding probability for " "a female. Even after controlling for the influence of gender, we see that " "the probability of an economics major defecting is almost 0.17 higher than " "the corresponding probability for a nonmajor." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "The coefficients for the unlimited and intermediate experimental categories " "represent effects relative to the defection rate for the limited category. " "As expected, the defection rate is smaller in the intermediate category " "(where subjects have more time to interact than in the limited category), " "and falls sharply further in the unlimited category (where subjects are " "permitted to make promises to cooperate). With subjects' permission, we " "tape recorded the conversations of several of the unlimited groups, and " "invariably each person promised each of his partners he would cooperate. " "(There would be little point, after all, in promising to defect.)" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Note, finally, that the overall defection rate declines significantly as " "students progress through school. The class coefficient is interpreted to " "mean that with the passage of each year the probability of defection " "declines, on the average, by almost 0.07. This pattern will prove important " "when we take up the question of whether training in economics is the cause " "of higher defection rates for economics majors." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h6> msgid "The Unlimited Subsample" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Focusing on subjects in the unlimited subsample, we see in Figure 7 that the " "difference between economics majors and nonmajors virtually disappears once " "subjects are permitted to make promises to cooperate. For this subsample, " "the defection rate for economics majors is 28.6 percent, for nonmajors 25.9 " "percent." msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 7" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "<strong>Figure 7. The Unlimited Subsample (Promises Permitted). </strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h6> msgid "The Intermediate and Limited Subsamples" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Because the higher defection rates for economics majors are largely " "attributable to the no-promises conditions of the experiment, the remainder " "of our analysis focuses on subjects in the limited and intermediate groups. " "The conditions encountered by these groups are of special significance " "because they come closest to approximating the conditions that characterize " "social dilemmas encountered in practice. After all, people rarely have an " "opportunity to look one another in the eye and promise not to litter on " "deserted beaches or disconnect the smog control devices on their cars." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "In Figure 8 we report the choices for the pooled limited and intermediate " "groups. Comparing the entries in Figure 8 with Figure 7, we see clear " "evidence of the higher defection rates of both economics majors and " "nonmajors. The defection rates of 71.8 percent and 47.3 percent for " "economics majors and nonmajors, respectively, differ significantly from one " "another at the .01 level." msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 8" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "<strong>Figure 8. Defection and Cooperation Rates for the No-Promises " "Subsample. </strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h6> msgid "Reasons for Cooperation and Defection" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "As part of the exit questionnaire that tested our subjects' understanding of " "the payoffs associated with different combinations of choices, we also asked " "them to state their reasons for making the choices they did. We " "hypothesized that economists would be more inclined to construe the " "objective of the game in self-interested terms, and therefore more likely to " "refer exclusively to features of the game itself when describing reasons for " "their choices. By contrast, we expected the noneconomists to be more open " "to alternative ways of interpreting the game, and thus more likely to look " "to their partners for cues about how to play. Accordingly, we expected " "noneconomists to refer more often to their feelings about their partners, " "aspects of human nature, and so on. This is precisely the pattern we " "found. Among the sample of economics students, 31% made exclusive reference " "to features of the game itself in explaining their chosen strategies, as " "compared with only 17% of the noneconomists. The probability of obtaining " "such divergent responses by chance is less than .05." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Another possible explanation for the economists' higher defection rates is " "that economists may be more likely than others to expect their partners to " "defect. The self-interest model, after all, encourages such an expectation, " "and we know from other experiments that most subjects defect if they are " "told that their partners are going to defect. To investigate the role of " "expectations, we asked students in an upper division public finance course " "in Cornell's economics department whether they would cooperate or defect in " "a one-shot prisoner's dilemma if they knew <i>with certainty</i> that their " "partner was going to cooperate. Most of these students were economics " "majors in their junior and senior years. Of the 31 students returning our " "questionnaires, 18 (58 percent) reported that they would defect, only 13 " "that they would cooperate. By contrast, just 34 percent (14 of 41) " "noneconomics Cornell undergraduates who were given the same questionnaire " "reported that they would defect on a partner they knew would cooperate " "(p<.05). For the same two groups of subjects, almost all respondents (30 " "of 31 economics students and 36 of 41 noneconomics students) said they would " "defect if they knew their partner would defect. From these responses, we " "conclude that while expectations of partner performance do indeed play a " "strong role in predicting behavior, defection rates would remain " "significantly higher for economists than for noneconomists even if both " "groups held identical expectations about partner performance." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h4> msgid "II. Why Do Economists Behave Differently?" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "In the preceding sections we have seen evidence that economists behave less " "cooperatively than noneconomists along a variety of different dimensions. " "This difference in behavior might be exclusively the result of training in " "economics. Alternatively, it might exist simply because people who chose to " "major in economics were different initially. Or it might be some " "combination of these two effects. We now report evidence on whether " "training in economics plays a causal role." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h5> msgid "A. Comparing Upperclassmen and Underclassmen" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "If economics training plays a causal role in uncooperative behavior, then we " "would expect defection rates in the prisoner's dilemma experiments to rise " "with exposure to training in economics. Again focusing on the no-promises " "subsample, the defection rates are broken down by major and level of " "education in Figure 9. As shown, the defection rate for economics majors is " "virtually the same for both upperclassmen (juniors and seniors) and " "underclassmen (freshmen and sophomores). By contrast, the defection rate " "for nonmajors is approximately 33 percent higher for underclassmen than for " "upperclassmen." msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 9" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "<strong>Figure 9. Defection Rates for Upper- and Underclassmen. </strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "The pattern shown in Figure 9 continues to hold when we control for the " "effects of other factors that influence defection rates. As the regression " "equation summarized in Table 3 shows, the defection probabilities do not " "differ significantly between upperclass economics majors and underclass " "economics majors. For nonmajors, defection probabilities are sharply lower " "than for majors in each category, and fall by more than 0.16 with the " "transition to upperclass status." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><caption><small> msgid "<small>R<sup>2</sup> = 16.4%    R<sup>2</sup>(adjusted) = 12.8%" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><caption> msgid "s = 0.4673 with 124 - 6 = 118 degrees of freedom</small>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "5.0359" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "95" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "1.007" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "24.61" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "25.7624" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "118" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.218325" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.628734" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.1436" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "4.38" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-0.095040" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.0876" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-1.09" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.257538" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.0896" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "2.88" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "econ 1,2" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "econ 3,4" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-0.026936" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.1623" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-0.166" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "nonecon 1,2" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-0.151050" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.1426" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-1.06" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "nonecon 3,4" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-0.313266" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "0.1427" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><table><tr><td> msgid "-2.20" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><p> msgid "<strong>Table 3. The Effect of Education Level on Defection Rates.</strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Thus, for students in general there is a pronounced tendency toward more " "cooperative behavior with movement toward graduation, a trend that is " "conspicuously absent for economics majors. On the basis of the available " "evidence, we are in no position to say whether the trend for noneconomists " "reflects something about the content of noneconomics courses. But " "regardless of the causes of this trend, the fact that it is not present for " "economists is consistent with the hypothesis that training in economics " "plays at least some causal role in the lower observed cooperation rates of " "economists." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h5> msgid "B. Honesty Surveys" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "In a further attempt to assess whether training in economics inhibits " "cooperation in social dilemmas, we posed a pair of ethical dilemmas to " "students in two introductory microeconomics courses at Cornell University " "and to a control group of students in an introductory astronomy course, also " "at Cornell. In one dilemma, the owner of a small business is shipped ten " "microcomputers but is billed for only nine and the question is whether the " "owner will inform the computer company of the error. Subjects are first " "asked to estimate the chances (0 - 100%) that the owner would point out the " "mistake, and then, on the same response scale, to indicate how likely " "<i>they</i> would be to point out the error if they were the owner. The " "second dilemma concerns whether a lost envelope containing $100 and bearing " "the owner's name and address is likely to be returned by the person who " "finds it. Subjects are first asked to imagine that they have lost the " "envelope and to estimate the likelihood that a stranger would return it. " "They are then asked to assume that the roles are reversed and to indicate " "the chances that they would return the money to a stranger." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Students in each class completed the questionnaire on two occasions, first " "during the initial week of class in September, and then during the final " "week of class in December." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "For each of the four questions, each student was coded as being “more " "honest” if the probability checked for that question rose between " "September and December; “less honest” if it fell during that " "period; and “no change” if it remained the same. Our hypothesis " "was that even a single semester of introductory microeconomics would have a " "measurable effect both on students' expectations of the level of " "self-interested behavior in society and on their own propensities to behave " "self-interestedly." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "The first introductory microeconomics instructor (instructor A) whose " "students we surveyed is a mainstream economist with research interests in " "industrial organization and game theory. In class lectures, this instructor " "placed heavy emphasis on the prisoner's dilemma and related illustrations of " "how survival imperatives often militate against cooperation. The second " "microeconomics instructor (instructor B) is a specialist in economic " "development in Maoist China who did not emphasize such material to the same " "degree, but did assign a mainstream introductory text. On the basis of " "these differences, our expectation was that any observed effects of " "economics training should be stronger in instructor A's class than in " "instructor B's. The results for the three classes are summarized in Figures " "10-12." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "<strong>Introductory Microeconomics A (N 48)</strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 10" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "<strong>Figure 10. Questionnaire Findings, Introductory Microeconomics A. " "</strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "<strong>Introductory Microeconomics B (N 115)</strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 11" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "<strong>Figure 11. Questionnaire Findings, Introductory Microeconomics B. " "</strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "<strong>Introduction to Astronomy (N 30)</strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Figure 12" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "<strong>Figure 12. Questionnaire Findings: Introduction to Astronomy. " "</strong>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "As Figures 10 and 11 indicate, a tendency toward more cynical responses was " "observed in instructor A's introductory economics class but not in " "instructor B's. In our control group of introductory astronomy students " "(Figure 12), there was a weak tendency toward less cynical expectations and " "behavior over the course of the semester." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "It may seem natural to wonder whether the differences reflected in Figures " "10 and 11 might stem in part from the fact that students chose their " "instructors rather than being randomly assigned. Perhaps the ideological " "reputations of the two professors were known in advance to many students, " "with the result that a disproportionate number of the least cynical students " "chose to take instructor B's course. Two observations, however, weigh " "heavily against this interpretation. First, the average values of the " "initial responses to the four questions were in fact virtually the same for " "both classes. And second, note that Figures 10 and 11 record not the " "<i>level</i> of cynicism but the <i>change</i> in that level between the " "beginning and end of the course. Figure 11 thus tells us that even if the " "students in Microeconomics A were more cynical to begin with, they became " "still more so during the course of the semester. This finding is consistent " "with the hypothesis that emphasis on the self-interest model tends to " "inhibit cooperation." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h3> msgid "Discussion" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "There have been several previous attempts to discover whether economists " "behave in more self-interested ways than do noneconomists. The Marwell and " "Ames finding of a greater tendency to free ride on the part of economists is " "uncertain because their samples of economists and noneconomists were " "different on so many dimensions other than academic history and interests. " "The Carter and Irons findings on the ultimatum bargaining game were subject " "to an alternative interpretation based on the possibility that economics " "majors may have held different views on how performance in the preliminary " "word game affected entitlements in the ultimatum game." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "We believe our prisoner's dilemma results constitute the clearest " "demonstration to date of a large difference in the extent to which " "economists and noneconomists behave self-interestedly. And our survey of " "charitable giving lends additional support to the hypothesis that economists " "are more likely than others to free ride." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "But we also emphasize that both of these exercises produced evidence that " "economists behave in traditionally communitarian ways under at least some " "circumstances. For example, they reported spending as much time as others " "in volunteer activities, and their total gifts to charity were only slightly " "less than would have been expected on the basis of their incomes. Finally, " "in the unlimited version of our prisoner's dilemma experiments, where " "subjects were allowed to promise to cooperate, economists were almost as " "likely to cooperate as noneconomists were." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "We also found evidence consistent with the view that the differences in " "cooperativeness are caused in part by training in economics. First, we saw " "that the gap in defection rates between economics majors and nonmajors tends " "to widen as students move toward graduation. Second, we saw that " "introductory microeconomics, at least if taught in a certain way, seems to " "affect student attitudes toward honesty." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Clearly, our evidence for the existence of a difference between the behavior " "of economists and noneconomists is more compelling than our evidence for the " "causal role of economics training in creating that difference. But there is " "additional indirect evidence for such a role. One of the clearest patterns " "to emerge in several decades of experimental research on the prisoner's " "dilemma is that the behavior of any given player is strongly influenced by " "that player's prediction about what his partner will do. In experiments " "involving noneconomists, people who expect their partners to cooperate " "usually cooperate themselves, and those who expect their partners to defect " "almost always defect. In our experiments, economists were 42 percent more " "likely than noneconomists to predict that their partners would defect. It " "would be remarkable indeed if none of this difference in outlook were the " "result of repeated exposure to a behavioral model whose unequivocal " "prediction is that people will defect whenever self-interest dictates." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "For the sake of discussion, suppose that exposure to the self-interest model " "does, in fact, cause people to behave more selfishly. Should this be a " "cause for concern? To the extent that norms favoring cooperation help solve " "prisoner's dilemmas and other market failures, one cost of a rise in selfish " "behavior is a fall in the real value of economic output. Who bears this " "cost? By conventional accounts, it is those who continue to behave " "cooperatively, a troubling outcome on equity grounds. Several researchers " "have recently suggested, however, that the ultimate victims of " "noncooperative behavior may be the very people who practice it. Suppose, " "for example, that some people always cooperate in one-shot prisoner's " "dilemmas while others always follow the seemingly dominant strategy of " "defecting. If people are free to interact with others of their own " "choosing, and if there are cues that distinguish cooperators from defectors, " "then cooperators will interact selectively with one another and earn higher " "payoffs than defectors. Elsewhere we have shown that even on the basis of " "brief encounters involving strangers, experimental subjects are adept at " "predicting who will cooperate and who will defect in prisoner's dilemma " "games. If people are even better at predicting the behavior of people they " "know well, it seems that the direct pursuit of material self-interest may " "indeed often be self-defeating." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "These observations do not challenge the obvious importance of self-interest " "as a human motive. But they do suggest the need for a richer model of " "20human behavior, one that explicitly recognizes that people who hold " "cooperative motives often come out ahead." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h3> msgid "References" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Akerlof, George. “Loyalty Filters,” <i>The American Economic " "Review, 73,</i> March, 1983: 54-63." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Carter, John and Michael Irons. “Are Economists Different, and If So, " "Why?” <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives,</i> 5, Spring, 1991." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Carter, John and Michael Irons. “Are Economists Different, and If So, " "Why?” (longer, unpublished version of the paper above), College of the " "Holy Cross, Dec., 1990." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Dawes, Robyn. “Social Dilemmas,” <i>Annual Review of " "Psychology, 31,</i> 1980: 163-93." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Etzioni, Amitai. <i>The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics,</i> NY: " "The Free Press, 1988." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "Frank, Robert H. <i>Passions Within Reason,</i> NY: W. W. Norton, 1988." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Frank, Robert H., Thomas Gilovich, and Dennis T. Regan, “Can " "Cooperators Find One Another?” unpublished paper, 1992." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Gilligan, Carol. <i>In a Different Voice,</i> Cambridge, MA: Harvard " "University Press, 1982." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Guth, Werner, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze. “An " "Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,” <i>Journal of Economic " "Behavior and Organization,</i> 3, 1982: 367-88." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Hirshleifer, Jack. “On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and " "Promises,” in John Dupre, ed., <i>The Latest and the Best: Essays on " "Evolution and Optimality,</i> Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Kahneman, Daniel, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler. “Fairness and the " "Assumptions of Economics,” <i>Journal of Business,</i> 59, 1986: " "S286-S300." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Mansbridge, Jane J. <i>Beyond Self-Interest,</i> Chicago: University of " "Chicago Press, 1990." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Marwell, Gerald and Ruth Ames. “Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone " "Else?” <i>Journal of Public Economics,</i> 15 (1981): 295-310." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Tullock, Gordon. <i>The Vote Motive,</i> London: Institute for Economic " "Affairs, 1976." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <h3> msgid "Appendix 1: Whole Sample Probit and Logit Models" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><caption> msgid "<strong>Probit Model:</strong> Pr[own response 1 | X] F(X<code>b</code>)," msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><caption><small> msgid "<small>where F is the std. normal c.d.f." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><caption><small> msgid "Observations: 207    Cases Correct: 150" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><caption> msgid "Log Likelihood: -114.96953    Avg. Likelihood: .57383787</small>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "constant" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".2546171" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".3195718" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".7967445" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-1.002759" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".2312719" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-4.335844" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-.2769906" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".2439911" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-1.135249" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".00" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-.2005716" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".0952301" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-2.106178" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".7184583" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".1988373" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "3.613298" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".4831544" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".2410665" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "2.004237" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><caption> msgid "" "<strong>Logit Model:</strong> Pr[own response 1 | X] " "exp(X<code>b</code>)/(1+exp(X<code>b</code>))" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><caption><small> msgid "<small>Observations: 207    Cases Correct: 150" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><caption> msgid "Log Likelihood: -114.82229    Avg. Likelihood: .57424621</small>" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".4646459" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".5381353" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".8634368" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-1.696657" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".3991972" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-4.250174" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-.4859651" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".4060518" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-1.196806" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-.3469820" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".1628891" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "-2.130173" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "1.196511" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".3347973" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "3.573837" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".8411330" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid ".4056866" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><table><tr><td> msgid "2.073357" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <h3> msgid "Appendix 2: Ethics Questionnaire" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <p> msgid "" "This questionnaire is part of an ongoing study of attitudes toward ethical " "issues that arise in business and personal life. Please read each question " "carefully and try to imagine yourself in the situation it describes. Then " "check the most appropriate response category for each question." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h4> msgid "Question #1." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "In an effort to increase productivity, the owner of a small business has " "ordered ten personal computers for use by his staff. When the UPS shipment " "arrives, he notices that the invoice from the mail-order house bills for " "only nine PCs, even though all ten were included with the shipment." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "The owner has two options. (1) He can inform the mail-order house of its " "error and ask to be billed for the correct amount; or (2) he can pay the " "amount shown on the invoice and take no further action." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "If the owner pays the amount shown, the worst thing that can happen is that " "the mail-order house may later discover its error and bill him for the tenth " "computer. There is a high probability (0.99, say) that the error will never " "be discovered." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "What do you believe the chances are that the owner will inform the " "mail-order house of its mistake and ask to be billed for the correct amount? " "(Check one.)" msgstr "" #. type: Attribute 'alt' of: <div><p><img> msgid "Response grid" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h4> msgid "Question #2." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "If YOU were the owner in the situation described in Question #1, what are " "the chances you would inform the mail-order house of its mistake and ask to " "be billed for the correct amount? (Check one.)" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "(Please turn over)" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h4> msgid "Question #3." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "After attending a football game, you return home to discover that you have " "lost an envelope from your jacket pocket. The envelope contains $100 in " "cash and has your name and address written on the outside. A stranger has " "found the envelope." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "What would you say the chances are that this person will return your $100 to " "you? (Check one.)" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><h4> msgid "Question #4." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "If YOU found $100 in an envelope like the one described in Question #3, what " "are the chances that you would return the stranger's cash? (Check one.)" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "_____________________________________________________________________" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "For each of the following, please check the category that applies to you:" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "<strong>Sex:</strong> male_____________female____________" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "<strong>Class:</strong> freshman________ sophomore__________" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "junior___________senior_____________other _____________" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "There will be a followup to this questionnaire in December. In order to " "match the followup questionnaire with this one, we need an identifying code " "for each of you, one that preserves your anonymity and that you will be able " "to recall easily in December. Past experience has taught that a code with " "these properties can be made from your middle name and your mother's maiden " "name." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "Your middle name_____________________________________" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "Your mother's maiden name______________________________" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "Thank you very much for your cooperation." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "A shorter version of this article was published in the <cite><a " "href=\"https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.7.2.159\">Journal of " "Economic Perspectives</a></cite>, vol. 7, number 2 (Spring 1993), pages " "159–171." msgstr "" #. TRANSLATORS: Use space (SPC) as msgstr if you don't have notes. #. type: Content of: <div> msgid "*GNUN-SLOT: TRANSLATOR'S NOTES*" msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><div><p> msgid "" "Please send general FSF & GNU inquiries to <a " "href=\"mailto:gnu@gnu.org\"><gnu@gnu.org></a>. There are also <a " "href=\"/contact/\">other ways to contact</a> the FSF. Broken links and " "other corrections or suggestions can be sent to <a " "href=\"mailto:webmasters@gnu.org\"><webmasters@gnu.org></a>." msgstr "" #. TRANSLATORS: Ignore the original text in this paragraph, #. replace it with the translation of these two: # #. We work hard and do our best to provide accurate, good quality #. translations. However, we are not exempt from imperfection. #. Please send your comments and general suggestions in this regard #. to <a href="mailto:web-translators@gnu.org"> # #. <web-translators@gnu.org></a>.</p> # #. <p>For information on coordinating and submitting translations of #. our web pages, see <a #. href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations #. README</a>. #. type: Content of: <div><div><p> msgid "" "Please see the <a " "href=\"/server/standards/README.translations.html\">Translations README</a> " "for information on coordinating and submitting translations of this article." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "Copyright © 1999, 2008, 2019, 2020, 2023, 2024 Free Software " "Foundation, Inc." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "" "This page is licensed under a <a rel=\"license\" " "href=\"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/\">Creative Commons " "Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License</a>." msgstr "" #. TRANSLATORS: Use space (SPC) as msgstr if you don't want credits. #. type: Content of: <div><div> msgid "*GNUN-SLOT: TRANSLATOR'S CREDITS*" msgstr "" #. timestamp start #. type: Content of: <div><p> msgid "Updated:" msgstr ""