frank.html - en to zh_CN translation catalogue (197 entries)

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en: Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation? - GNU Project - Free Software Foundation
zh_CN: 学习经济学会抑制合作吗？- GNU 工程 - 自由软件基金会

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en: Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?
zh_CN: 学习经济学会抑制合作吗？

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en: by Robert H. Frank, Thomas Gilovich, and Dennis T. Regan
zh_CN: Robert H. Frank, Thomas Gilovich 和 Dennis T. Regan 合著

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en: In an essay written in 1879, Francis Amasa Walker tried to explain &ldquo;why economists tend to be in bad odor amongst real people.&rdquo; Walker, who went on to become the first president of the American Economic Association, argued that it was partly because economists disregard &ldquo;&hellip;the customs and beliefs that tie individuals to their occupations and locations and lead them to act in ways contrary to the predictions of economic theory.&rdquo;
zh_CN: 在 1879 年的一篇作品里，Francis Amasa Walker 试图解释 &ldquo;为什么经济学家在大众看来不那么顺眼。&rdquo;最后成了美国经济学会第一任主席的 Walker 提出之所以这样，部分原因是经济学家无视 &ldquo;&hellip;&hellip;和人们的职业与地域密切相关的风俗与信仰，而风俗和信仰会使人们的表现和经济学理论的预测大不相同。&rdquo;

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en: More than a century later, the general public continues to regard economists with suspicion.  This attitude stems in part from an apparent misunderstanding of economists' positions on important public policy issues.  For example, economists commonly advocate auctioning rights to discharge atmospheric pollutants to the highest bidders, leading critics to bemoan economists' &ldquo;shocking disregard for the environment and lack of compassion for the poor.&rdquo; What else, the critics ask, could enable them to support a program under which &ldquo;the rich can pollute to their heart's content?&rdquo; On closer examination, however, the economist's position is less hostile to the interests of the poor and the environment than it appears.  Indeed, as almost every economics student now knows, the effect of auctioning pollution rights is to concentrate the burden of pollution reduction in the hands not of the poor but of those people and firms who can reduce pollution at the lowest cost.  And this is an outcome that is clearly in the interests of all citizens, rich and poor alike.
zh_CN: 一个多世纪之后，公众还是对经济学家将信将疑。这种态度有一部分源自对经济学家在重要公共政策问题上之立场的明显误解。例如，经济学家通常会提倡由最高竞价者获得排放大气污染物的权利，这导致批评者抱怨经济学家 &ldquo;毫不顾及环境并对穷人缺乏同情&rdquo;。还有什么，批评者质问，能够让他们支持一个 &ldquo;富人的排放会污染他们心脏&rdquo; 的项目？不过，通过更细致地观察，经济学家的立场对穷人的利益和环境的考虑并不象表面看起来那么不堪。实际上，正如大多数学习经济的同学所知，污染权利竞价的效果是以最低的代价把负担集中到有能力降低污染的人们和企业手上，而不是让穷人负担。而这个结果显然符合所有公民的利益，无论穷人还是富人。

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en: Misunderstandings of this sort aside, there remains another important source of public skepticism toward economics &mdash; namely, the perception that economics encourages people to act selfishly in pursuit of their own material interests.  In this paper, we examine the validity of this perception.
zh_CN: 抛开这个误解不谈，公众对经济学家还有另一个重要的怀疑&mdash;&mdash;就是，人们认为经济学鼓励大家为追求物质利益而变得自私。本文将考察这个怀疑是否合理。

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en: Economists and the Self-Interest Model
zh_CN: 经济学家与利己主义模型

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en: If pressed, most economists will concede that people sometimes care about more than just their own material well being.  Many have concerns for the welfare of other people, for esthetics, for their duties as citizens, and so on.
zh_CN: 如果追问下去，大多数经济学家会承认人们并不总是只在意自身的物质利益。出于意识形态也好，出于作为公民的责任也罢，许多人也关心其他人的福利。

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en: Yet few economists include these broader concerns in their models of human behavior.  It may well be that the unpaid volunteer who heads the local United Way Campaign is driven purely by his concern for the disadvantaged; but economists feel on much firmer ground if they can identify some more narrowly self-interested motive for his action.  And on inspection, there is at least some evidence in support of their cynicism.  When we examine the membership rolls of volunteer organizations, we find that insurance brokers, real estate agents, car dealers, chiropractors, and others with something to sell tend to be disproportionately represented.  Such organizations have less than their share of truck drivers and postal employees.
zh_CN: 但是很少有经济学家把这些更广泛意义上的考虑纳入其人类行为学模型。没有报酬的志愿者可能完全是出于对弱势群体的关心而领导联合基金会的本地活动（United Way Campaign）；但是经济学家却更愿意相信应该挖掘更狭隘的个人利益动机。仔细考察之后，确实可以发现至少有些证据支持经济学家的犬儒主义论点。当我们审查志愿者组织的会员时，我们发现保险公司、地产中介、汽车销售、慈善会社以及其他一些销售性质的主体占有很高的比例。而这些组织中的卡车司机和快递员工占比却相对较低。

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en: The self-interest model has well established explanatory power.  Whatever role love may play in the sustenance of marriage relationships, we know that divorce rates are higher in states that provide liberal welfare benefits.  When energy prices rise, people are more likely to form car pools and to insulate their houses.  When the opportunity cost of time rises, people have fewer children.  And so on.  From the economist's perspective, motives other than self-interest may matter, but they are peripheral to the main thrust of human endeavor, and we indulge them at our peril.  In Gordon Tullock's words, &ldquo;the average human being is about 95 percent selfish in the narrow sense of the term.&rdquo;
zh_CN: 利己主义模型能够对此现象做出有力的解释。无论爱情在维护婚姻关系中充当何种角色，我们知道在提供自由福利的国家离婚率会更高。当能源价格升高时，人们更愿意拼车和为房屋做隔热。当时间机会成本增加时，人们会少生孩子。诸如此类，不胜枚举。在经济学家看来，个人利益之外的动机也可能有些关系，但是它们终究是人类活动主要驱动力的次要因素，而纵容它们会使我们面临风险。正如 Gordon Tullock 所言，&ldquo;正常人大概 95% 是狭隘意义上的自私。&rdquo;

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en: From its base in economics, the self-interest model has made strong inroads into a variety of other disciplines.  Psychologists, political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, game theorists, biologists, and others rely increasingly on this model to explain and predict human behavior.
zh_CN: 从其经济学基础出发，利己主义模型有力地影响着许多其他学科。心理学家、政治学家、社会学家、哲学家、游戏理论家、生物学家以及其他研究人员日益依赖此模型来解释和预测人类行为。

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en: The basic question we investigate in this paper is whether exposure to the self-interest model alters the extent to which people behave in self-interested ways.  The paper is organized into two parts.  In the first, we report the results of a series of empirical studies &mdash; some our own, some by other investigators &mdash; that support the hypothesis that economists behave in more self-interested ways.  By itself, this evidence does not demonstrate that exposure to the self-interest model is the <i>cause</i> of more self-interested behavior, although, as we will see, a case can be made for this proposition on a priori grounds.  An alternative interpretation is that economists may simply have been more self-interested to begin with, and this difference was one reason they chose to study economics.  In the second part of the paper, we present preliminary evidence that exposure to the self-interest model does in fact increase self-interested behavior.
zh_CN: 本文研究的基本问题是了解利己主义模型之后，关注个人利益的行为是否发生程度上的变化。文章将分为两个部分。在第一部分，我们将汇报一系列经验研究的结果&mdash;&mdash;其中有些是我们做的，有些是其他研究者做的&mdash;&mdash;这些研究支持经济学家的行为更关注个人利益的假设。就其本身而言，这些证据并不能展示出了解个人利益模型是更关注个人利益的 <i>原因</i>，尽管我们会看到一个案例可以根据先验理由推出这种关系。另一种解释是经济学家本来一开始就更关注个人利益，而这种不同正是他们选择研究经济学的一个原因。在第二部分，我们将提供一些初步证据来表明了解个人利益模型确实会增加关注个人利益的行为。

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en: I. Do Economists Behave Differently?
zh_CN: I. 经济学家的行为有所不同吗？

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en: A. The Free-Rider Experiments
zh_CN: A. 搭便车实验

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en: One of the clearest predictions of the self-interest model is that people will tend to free-ride on the efforts of others when it comes to the provision of public or collective goods.  Even people who would strongly benefit from having, say, higher program quality on public TV have little incentive to contribute.  After all, any single individual's contribution is far too small to alter the likelihood of achieving the desired outcome.
zh_CN: 利己主义模型的一个最明确的预言是当涉及公共或集体物品供给时，人们会倾向于搭别人努力的便车。即使会大受其益的人——比如会享受更高质量公共电视节目的人——也很少愿意主动付出。个人贡献毕竟太小，很难为达成目标带来实质影响。

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en: A study by Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames found that students of economics are indeed much more likely to free-ride in experiments that called for private contributions to public goods.  Their basic experiment involved a group of subjects who were given an initial endowment of money, which they were to allocate between two accounts, one &ldquo;public,&rdquo; the other &ldquo;private.&rdquo; Money deposited in a subject's private account was returned dollar for dollar to the subject at the end of the experiment.  Money deposited in the public account was first pooled, then multiplied by some factor greater than one, and then distributed equally among all subjects.
zh_CN: Gerald Marwell 和 Ruth Ames 的一项研究实验发现学经济的学生确实在号召大家为公共福利做个人贡献时远比其他人更愿意搭便车。实验的基本设置包括一组对象。这些对象被分配了一定量的初始资金，他们需要把这些资金存入两个账户：一个是 &ldquo;公共账户&rdquo;，另一个是 &ldquo;个人账户&rdquo;。实验结束后，个人账户的资金会一分不少的发给每个实验对象。而公共账户的钱则会首先汇总，乘以一个大于 1 的系数，然后再平均分配给每个实验对象。

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en: Under these circumstances, the socially optimal behavior is for each subject to put her entire endowment in the public account.  But the individually most advantageous strategy is to put all of it in the private account.  The self-interest model predicts that all subjects will follow the latter strategy.  Most don't.  Across eleven replications of the experiment, the average contribution to the public account was approximately 49 percent.
zh_CN: 在这种条件下，每个实验对象的最优社会行为是把所有的初始资金都存入公共账户。但是个人最有利策略则是把所有资金都存到个人账户。利己主义模型的预测是所有实验对象都将采用后者。大多数人并没有这样做。在 11 次试验中，对公共账户的平均贡献率大约是 49%。

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en: It was only in a twelfth replication with first-year graduate students in economics as subjects that Marwell and Ames obtained results more nearly consistent with the self-interest model.  These subjects contributed an average of only 20 percent of their initial endowments to the public account, a figure significantly less than the corresponding figure for noneconomists (p&lt;.05).
zh_CN: 仅在第 12 次试验中，学经济学的一年级新生作为试验对象，Marwell 和 Ames 得到的结果更接近利己主义模型。这些试验对象只把初始资金的 20% 贡献到公共账户，这个数据明显低于非经济学试验对象的数据 (p&lt;.05)。

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en: On completion of each replication of the experiment, Marwell and Ames asked their subjects two followup questions:
zh_CN: 每次试验结束之后，Marwell 和 Ames 会问试验对象以下两个问题：

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en: What is a &ldquo;fair&rdquo; investment in the public good?
zh_CN: 什么是一个 &ldquo;合理的&rdquo; 公共福利投入？

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en: Are you concerned about &ldquo;fairness&rdquo; in making your investment decision?
zh_CN: 你是否考虑过投资决定的 &ldquo;合理性&rdquo;？

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en: In response to the first question, 75 percent of the noneconomists answered &ldquo;half or more&rdquo; of the endowment, and 25 percent answered &ldquo;all.&rdquo; In response to question 2, almost all noneconomists answered &ldquo;yes.&rdquo; The corresponding responses of the economics graduate students were much more difficult to summarize.  As Marwell and Ames wrote,
zh_CN: 在第一个问题的回答里面，75% 的非经济学试验对象说：初始资金的 &ldquo;一半或更多&rdquo;，另外 25% 的人说：&ldquo;全部&rdquo;。在第二个问题的回答里面，几乎所有的非经济学试验对象都说：&ldquo;是的&rdquo;。而经济学试验对象的反应就相当难总结和概括。正如 Marwell 和 Ames 写道，

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en: &hellip; More than one-third of the economists either refused to answer the question regarding what is fair, or gave very complex, uncodable responses.  It seems that the meaning of &lsquo;fairness&rsquo; in this context was somewhat alien for this group.  Those who did respond were much more likely to say that little or no contribution was &lsquo;fair.&rsquo; In addition, the economics graduate students were about half as likely as other subjects to indicate that they were &lsquo;concerned with fairness&rsquo; in making their decisions.
zh_CN: &hellip;超过三分之一的经济学家不是拒绝回答关于什么是合理性的问题，就是给出了十分复杂、无法解析的回复。看来 &lsquo;合理性&rsquo; 此时的含义对此类人非常陌生。作出回答的那部分人更愿意回答说少做或不做贡献是 &lsquo;合理的。&rsquo; 此外，经济系的学生在做决定时 &lsquo;考虑合理性&rsquo; 的可能性大概只有其他专业学生的一半。

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en: The Marwell and Ames study can be criticized on the grounds that their noneconomist control groups consisted of high school students and college undergraduates, who differ in a variety of ways from first-year graduate students in any discipline.  Perhaps the most obvious difference is age.  As we will see, however, criticism based on the age difference is blunted by our own evidence that older students generally give greater weight to social concerns like the ones that arise in free-rider experiments.  It remains possible, however, that more mature students might have had a more sophisticated understanding of the nuances and ambiguities inherent in concepts like fairness, and for that reason gave less easily coded responses to the followup questions.
zh_CN: Marwell 和 Ames 的研究也会因为非经济学对照组包含了高中生和专科生而遭受批评，这类人和一年级大学生相比有诸多不同。可能最明显的区别就是年龄。然而，我们就会看到，在搭便车实验中，基于年龄的批评在较年长学生通常对社会担忧贡献更大的证据面前显得苍白无力。另一方面，还可能是更成熟的学生对合理性这种精细而模糊的概念有更复杂的理解，这就导致他们对此的回答更不易被解读。

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en: Yet another concern with the Marwell and Ames experiments is not easily dismissed.  Although the authors do not report the sex composition of their group of economics graduate students, such groups are almost always preponderantly male.  The authors' control groups of high school and undergraduate students, by contrast, consisted equally of males and females.  As our own evidence will later show, there is a sharp tendency for males to behave less cooperatively in experiments of this sort.  So while the Marwell and Ames findings are suggestive, they do not clearly establish that economists behave differently.
zh_CN: 不过，Marwell 和 Ames 实验中还有一个不容易化解的疑虑。虽然作者的报告没有提及经济系学生的性别组成，但是这种人群几乎总是由男性占大多数。相比较，由高中生和专科生组成的对照组男女比例均衡。后面我们的证据会表明，男性在此类实验中的表现非常倾向于不合作。因此，Marwell 和 Ames 的发现富有启发性，但是他们没能明确地说明经济学家的行为有不同。

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en: B. Economists and the Ultimatum Bargaining Game
zh_CN: B. 经济学家和最后通牒博弈游戏

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en: The other major study of whether economists behave differently from members of other disciplines is by John Carter and Michael Irons (1991).  These authors measured the self-interestedness of economists by examining their behavior in the ultimatum bargaining game.  This is a simple game with two players, an &ldquo;allocator&rdquo; and a &ldquo;receiver.&rdquo; The allocator is given a sum of money (in these experiments, $10), and must then propose how to divide this sum between herself and the receiver.  Suppose, for example, the allocator proposes $X for herself, the remaining $(10-X) for the receiver.  Once the allocator makes this proposal, the receiver has two choices: (1)  he may accept, in which case each player gets the amount proposed by the allocator; or (2) he may refuse, in which case each player gets zero.  The game is played only once by the same partners.
zh_CN: 另一项关于经济学家的行为是否和其他学科成员有区别的重要研究来自 John Carter 和 Michael Irons (1991)。他们通过观察经济学家在最后通牒博弈游戏中的行为测量了他们的利己主义程度。这是一个由两个玩家参与的简单游戏，一个是 &ldquo;提议者&rdquo;，另一个是 &ldquo;响应者&rdquo;。提议者有一定量的钱（游戏中是 10 美元），她必须建议如何与响应者分配这些钱。例如，提议者可以建议自己拿 X 美元，剩下的 10-X 归响应者。提议者给出建议之后，响应者有两个选择：(1) 他接受建议，这样两个人各获得由提议者建议的钱数；(2) 他拒绝建议，此时两个人都无钱可拿。游戏只在同一对人之间进行一次。

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en: If both players behave according to the self-interest model, the model makes an unequivocal prediction about how the game will proceed.  Assuming the money cannot be divided into units smaller than one cent, the allocator will propose $9.99 for herself and the remaining $0.01 for the receiver, and the receiver will accept on the grounds that a penny is better than nothing.  Since the game will not be repeated, there is no point in the receiver turning down a low offer in the hope of generating a better offer in the future.
zh_CN: 如果两个玩家都按照利己主义模型来表现的话，该模型能够毫不含糊地预测游戏的进程。假设钱的最小单位是 1 分，那么提议者会给自己 9.99 美元，并把 1 分钱留给响应者，而响应者会因为 1 分钱也比没有好接受那 1 分钱。由于游戏只进行一次，响应者也没有道理不接受现在的提议而等待将来更好的提议。

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en: Other researchers have shown that the strategy predicted by the self-interest model is almost never followed in practice: 50-50 splits are the most common outcome, and most one-sided offers are rejected out of concerns about fairness.
zh_CN: 其他研究表明利己主义模型预测的策略实际上从未被执行：五五开的结果最常见，大多数单边提议鉴于合理性被拒绝。

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en: The research strategy employed by Carter and Irons was to compare the performance of economics majors and other students and see which group came closer to the predictions of the self-interest model.  In a sample of 43 economics majors, the average minimum amount acceptable by the receiver was $1.70, as compared with an average of $2.44 for a sample of 49 noneconomics majors (p&lt;.05).  As receivers then, economics majors came significantly closer than nonmajors to the behavior predicted by the self-interest model.
zh_CN: Carter 和 Irons 的研究策略在于比较经济专业和其他专业的学生在此游戏中的表现，并观察哪个群体的行为更接近利己主义模型的预测。在 43 个经济专业学生的样本下，响应者平均接受的金钱是 $1.70，而其他专业 49 个学生的平均值是 $2.44 (p&lt;.05)。作为响应者，经济系学生的行为明显比其他专业的学生更接近利己主义模型的预测。

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en: In the allocator's role as well, economics majors performed more in accordance with the predictions of the self-interest model than did nonmajors.  Economics proposed to keep an average of $6.15 for themselves, as compared to an average of only $5.44 for the sample of 49 nonmajors (p&lt;.01).
zh_CN: 提议者的结果也类似，经济系学生的行为比其他专业的学生更符合利己主义模型的预测。经济系学生提议者平均提议自己获得 $6.15，而其他 49 个非经济系学生平均只有 $5.44 (p&lt;.01)。

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en: Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) report findings similar to those of Carter and Irons: commerce students (the term used to describe business students in Canadian universities) were more likely than psychology students to make one-sided offers in ultimatum bargaining games.
zh_CN: Kahneman、Knetsch 和 Thaler (1986) 汇报了与 Carter 和 Irons 类似的结果：在最后通牒博弈游戏中，商科学生（加拿大大学用来描述学习商业的学生）比心理系学生更倾向于作出单边提议。

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en: One difficulty with the Carter and Irons results is that the way they assigned the allocator and receiver roles leaves open possible differences in the interpretation of what behavior is required in the name of fairness.  In particular, allocators earned their role by having achieved higher scores on a preliminary word game.  Allocators might thus reason that they were entitled to a greater share of the surplus on the strength of their earlier performance.  The observed differences in the behavior of economics majors and nonmajors might therefore be ascribed to a differential tendency to attach significance to the earlier performance differences.  The training received by economics students in the marginal productivity theory of wages lends at least surface plausibility to this interpretation.
zh_CN: Carter 和 Irons 的结果面临一个难题，他们分配提议者和响应者的方法让人有可能对什么是合理行为有不同的解释。特别是，提议者通过在初选的文字游戏中获得高分来得到提议者身份。因此，提议者可能会根据前期表现较好来推断自己应该有权分到更多的钱。所以，经济系和非经济系学生观察结果的差异也可能是前期表现差异的体现。经济系学生受到的边际生产力教育至少让这种解释不那么离谱。

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en: To summarize the existing literature, both the Marwell and Ames and Carter and Irons papers provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that economists tend to behave less cooperatively than noneconomists.  But because of the specific experimental design problems mentioned, neither study is conclusive.  In the following sections we describe our own attempts to test the hypothesis that economists behave less cooperatively.
zh_CN: 对文献做个总结，Marwell 和 Ames 以及 Carter 和 Irons 的论文都为经济学家比其他人更倾向于不合作的假设提供了支持性证据。但是由于如上所述的具体实验设计问题，他们的研究都不能做明确的结论。在以下章节中，我们会描述我们自己用来测试经济学家的行为更加不合作这一假设的努力。

note: type: Content of: <h5>
en: C. Survey Data on Charitable Giving
zh_CN: C. 调查数据和慈善捐赠

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: The central role of the free-rider hypothesis in modern economic theory suggests that economists might be less likely than others to make gifts to private charities.  To explore this possibility, we mailed questionnaires to 1245 college professors randomly chosen from the professional directories of 23 disciplines, asking them to report the annual dollar amounts they gave to a variety of private charities.  We received 576 responses with sufficient detail for inclusion in our study.  Respondents were grouped into the following disciplines: economics (N 75); other social sciences (N 106); math, computer science, and engineering (N 48); natural sciences (N 98); humanities (N 94); architecture, art, and music (N 68); and professional (N 87).  Members of every discipline, even economics, fell far short of the prediction of the strong version of the free-rider hypothesis.  But the proportion of pure free riders among economists (that is, those who reported giving no money to any charity) was more than double that of any of the other six areas included in the survey.  (See Figure 1.)
zh_CN: 在现代经济学理论中，搭便车假说的核心建议是经济学家可能会比其他人更不愿意为私人慈善团体作出捐助。为了研究这种可能性，我们随机从 23 个学科中选择了 1245 名大学教授，并向他们邮寄问卷。问卷要求他们汇报他们每年向各种私人慈善团体捐助的金钱数目。我们收到了 576 份带有充分细节的回复。回复者按照以下学科分类：经济学 (N 75)；其他社会科学 (N 106)；数学、计算机科学以及工程学 (N 48)；自然科学 (N 98)；人类学 (N 94)；建筑、艺术和音乐 (N 68)；雇员 (N 87)。每个学科的人数，包括经济学，都远比强搭便车假说所预测的要少。但是完全搭便车者（即没有给任何慈善机构做捐助的人）在经济学中占有的比例超过被调查的其他 6 个学科中任何一个的两倍。（参开图一）

note: type: Attribute 'alt' of: <p><img>
en: Figure 1
zh_CN: 图一

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Figure 1. Proportion of Pure Free Riders in Seven Disciplines.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图一 7 个学科中完全搭便车者所占的比例。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Although we do not have data on the gender of each survey respondent, gender differences by discipline do not appear to account for the pattern of free-ridership shown in Figure 1.  For example, the natural sciences, which are also preponderantly male, had only one-third as many free riders as did economics.
zh_CN: 虽然我们没有被调查者的性别数据，不过学科的性别差异看来并不是图一中搭便车者比例的原因。比如，自然学科，主要以男性为主，其中的搭便车者只有经济学的三分之一。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Despite their generally higher incomes, economists were also among the least generous in terms of their median gifts to large charities like viewer-supported television and the United Way, which are shown in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.
zh_CN: 尽管经济学家通常有较高的收入，但是就对大型慈善机构——收看者付费电视和 United Way——的中等捐助来说，他们也是最不慷慨者。

note: type: Attribute 'alt' of: <p><img>
en: Figure 2
zh_CN: 图二

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en: <strong>Figure 2. Median Gift to Public Television.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图二 对公众电视的中等捐助。</strong>

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en: Figure 3
zh_CN: 图三

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Figure 3. Median Gift to the United Way.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图三 对 United Way 的中等捐助。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: In fairness to the self-interest model, we should note that there may be self-interested reasons for contributing even in the case of charities like the United Way and public television.  United Way campaigns, for example, are usually organized in the workplace and there is often considerable social pressure to contribute.  Public television fund drives often make on-the-air announcements of donors' names and economists stand to benefit just as much as the members of any other discipline from being hailed as community-minded citizens.  In the case of smaller, more personal charitable organizations, there are often even more compelling self-interested reasons for giving.  After all, failure to contribute in accordance with one's financial ability may mean outright exclusion from the substantial private benefits associated with membership in religious groups, fraternal organizations, and the like.
zh_CN: 就利己主义模型的合理性而言，我们应当注意即使是对公共电视和 United Way 这样的慈善机构人们也有利己主义理由来捐助。例如 United Way 的活动经常会在工作场合进行，其中就有相当大的社交压力来捐助。公众电视的筹款活动通常广播捐助者的名字，经济学家和其他学科的成员一样都有被当作社区热心人而享受欢呼的愿望。对于更小的、更个人的慈善组织，通常有更强烈的利己主义原因来捐助。总之，没能做出和自己收入相匹配的捐助可能意味着彻底脱离了宗教团体会员、兄弟会成员之类组织带来的大量个人益处。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: An examination of economists' gifts to other charities revealed that their median annual gift is actually slightly larger, in absolute terms, than the median for all disciplines taken as a whole.  But because economists have significantly higher salaries than do the members of most other disciplines, these data, like the data shown in Figures 2 and 3, tend to overstate the relative generosity of economists.  Unfortunately, we do not have direct income measures for the respondents in our survey, but we do have the number of years each respondent has been a practitioner in his or her discipline.  In an attempt to take income effects into account, we estimated earnings functions (salary vs. years of experience) for each discipline using data from a large private university.  We then applied the estimated coefficients from these earnings functions to the experience data from our survey to impute an income estimate for each respondent in our survey.  Finally, we used these imputed income figures, together with our respondents' reports of their total charitable giving to estimate the relationship between income and total giving shown in Figure 4.  In the latter exercise, all economists were dropped from the sample on the grounds that our object was to see whether the giving pattern of economists deviates from the pattern we see for other disciplines.
zh_CN: 对经济学家向其他慈善组织捐助的进一步观察，我们发现他们的年度捐助中位数的绝对值实际上比其他学科合在一起的中位数要稍微大一些。但是因为经济学家的收入明显要比其他人群高，这个数据，如图二和图三所示，实际上夸大了经济学家的慷慨程度。不幸的是，我们没有调查对向的直接收入情况，但是我们有这些被调查者在其学科的从业年限。为了考虑收入对调查结果的印响，我们使用了一个有较大规模的私立大学的数据来估算每个学科的收入方程（工资和工作年限的关系）。然后，我们把该收入估算方程应用到我们的调查数据中，由此计算出每个调查回应者的估计收入。最后，我们在图四中展示了每个回应者估计收入和其报告的总慈善捐助的关系。在后面的研究中，我们去除了全部经济学家的数据，由此来查看带有经济学家数据的趋势和没有经济学家的趋势有无不同。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Thus, for example, in Figure 4 we see that a noneconomist with an annual income of $44,000 (roughly, the median imputed income for architects in our sample) is expected to give almost $900 per year to charity, while a noneconomist with an income of $62,000 (roughly the median imputed income for economists in our sample) is expected to give more than $1400 per year.
zh_CN: 因此，举例来说，在图四中，我们看到年收入 $44,000（大概是建筑师的估计收入中位数）的非经济学家每年预期捐助差不多是 $900，而年收入 $62,000（大概是经济学家的估计收入中位数）的非经济学家每年预期捐助超过 $1400。

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en: Figure 4
zh_CN: 图四

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Figure 4. Charitable Giving vs. Imputed Income.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图四 慈善捐助对比估计收入。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Using the relationship between charitable giving and income, we calculated the expected gift for each respondent as a function of his or her imputed income.  We then calculated our measure of a discipline's generosity as the ratio of the average value of gifts actually reported by members of the discipline to the average value of gifts expected on the basis of the members' imputed incomes.  A discipline is thus more generous than expected if this ratio exceeds 1.0, and less generous if it is less than 1.0.  The computed ratio for economists was 0.91, which means that economists in our sample gave 91 percent as much as they would have been expected to give on the basis of their imputed incomes.  The performance of economists by this measure is compared with the performance of other disciplines in Figure 5.
zh_CN: 利用慈善捐助和估计收入数据，我们计算了每个调查回应者的估计收入和预期捐助的方程。然后。我们计算了每个学科的慷慨程度，即每个学科成员实际报告的捐助和根据估计收入计算出来的预期捐助之比。如果某学科的比例大于 1.0，则该学科比小于 1.0 的学科更慷慨。对经济学家计算出的慷慨比例是 0.91，这意味着我们调查的经济学家的捐助是他们按照估计收入预期应该捐助的 91%。经济学家的该项数据和其他学科的比较展示在图五中。

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en: Figure 5
zh_CN: 图五

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en: <strong>Figure 5. The Ratio of Average Gift to Gift Expected on the Basis of Income.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图五 平均实际捐助和根据估计收入计算的预期捐助之比。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: On a number of other dimensions covered in our survey, the behavior of economists was little different from the behavior of members of other disciplines.  For example, economists were only marginally less likely than members of other disciplines to report that they would take costly administrative action to prosecute a student suspected of cheating.  Economists were actually slightly above average for the entire sample in terms of the numbers of hours they reportedly spend in &ldquo;volunteer activities.&rdquo; In terms of their reported frequency of voting in presidential elections, economists were only slightly below the sample average.
zh_CN: 就我们调查的其他几个维度来看，经济学家的行为和其他学科并无不同。例如，经济学家对可能作弊的学生采取行政手段的可能性仅仅比其他学科成员略高。实际上，参与调查的经济学家汇报的 &ldquo;志愿活动&rdquo; 时长也稍高于整个调查团体的平均值。而经济学家汇报的参与总统选举投票的频率也只是略低于整个团体的平均。

note: type: Content of: <h5>
en: D. Economists and the Prisoner's Dilemma
zh_CN: D. 经济学家和囚徒困境

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: In this section we report our results from a large experimental study of how economics majors and nonmajors perform in the prisoner's dilemma game.
zh_CN: 在此节，我们报告一个大型实验的结果。该实验研究的是经济学专业和非经济学专业在囚徒困境游戏中的表现如何。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Table 1 shows the monetary payoffs in dollars to two players, X and Y, in a standard prisoner's dilemma. In Table 1, as in all prisoner's dilemmas, each player gets a higher payoff when each cooperates than when each defects.  But when one player's strategy is fixed, the other player always gets a higher payoff by defecting than by cooperating; and hence the dilemma.  By following individual self-interest, each player does worse than if each had cooperated.
zh_CN: 表一展示了在标准囚徒困境游戏中两个玩家的金钱收益：X 和 Y（美元）。正如在所有的囚徒困境类游戏所展现的结果，表一中两方合作的收益总是大于背叛。但是当一方的策略固定时，另一方背叛总能获得比合作更多的收益；所以这是一个困境。如果从利己主义出发，每个玩家都要比合作的结果差。

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en: Table 1
zh_CN: 表一

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Table 1. Monetary Payoffs for a Prisoner's Dilemma Game.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>表一. 囚徒困境游戏的金钱收益。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: One of the most celebrated and controversial predictions of the self-interest model is that people will always defect in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas.  The game thus provides an opportunity to examine the extent to which various groups exhibit self-interested behavior.  Accordingly, we conducted a large one-shot prisoner's dilemma experiment involving both economics majors and nonmajors.  Many of our subjects were students recruited from courses in which the prisoner's dilemma is an item on the syllabus.  Others were given a detailed briefing about the game.
zh_CN: 利己主义模型最著名而又最富争议的预言之一是在一次性的囚徒困境游戏中人们总是会背叛。因此，这种游戏为研究各种人群的利己主义程度提供了一个机会。由此，我们进行了一场大型的一次性囚徒困境试验，其中包括经济学专业学生也包括其他专业的学生。我们的许多试验对象是从大纲中需要学习囚徒困境的学生中招募的。我们为其他试验对象简短地解释了囚徒困境游戏。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Our subjects met in groups of three and each was told that he would play the game once with each of the other two subjects.  The payoff matrix, shown in Table 1, was the same for each play of the game.  Subjects were told that the games would be played for real money, and that none of the players would learn how their partners had responded in each play of the game.  (More below on how confidentiality was maintained.)
zh_CN: 试验对象三人一组，每个人都将和另外两个人进行一次游戏。如表一所示，每次游戏的收益矩阵都一样。我们告诉试验对象游戏是真金白银的，并且每个人都不能看其他人在每轮游戏中的应对。（下面会详述如何保密。）

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Following a period in which subjects were given an opportunity to get to know one another, each subject was taken to a separate room and asked to fill out a form indicating his response (cooperate or defect)  to each of the other two players in his group.  After the subjects had filled out their forms, the results were tallied and the payments disbursed.  Each subject received a single payment that was the sum of three separate amounts: (1) the payoff from the game with the first partner; (2) the payoff from the game with the second partner; and (3)  a term that was drawn at random from a large list of positive and negative values.  None of these three elements could be observed separately, only their sum.
zh_CN: 在大家互相认识之后，每个试验对象会被带到一个单独的房间。他们被要求在房间里填写他们对组内其他两个玩家的策略（合作或背叛）。填好表格之后，结果被记录并支付薪酬。每个试验对象会有一次性支付的薪酬，它由以下三部分组成：(1) 和第一个对手游戏后的收益；(2) 和第二个对手游戏之后的收益；(3) 随机从一大堆有正有负的数里抽到的数值。玩家看不到单独的结果，只能看到一次性获得的总薪酬。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: The purpose of the random term was to make it impossible for a subject to infer from her total payment how any of the other subjects had played.  It prevented both the possibility of inferring individual choices and also of inferring even group patterns of choice.  Thus, unlike earlier prisoner's dilemma experiments, ours did not enable the subject to infer what happened even when each (or neither) of her partners defected.
zh_CN: 随机数的目的是让试验对象无法从其总薪酬中推断其他玩家的表现。随机数既防止了推断个人的选择，也防止了推断小组选择的模式。因此，和以前的囚徒困境游戏不同，我们的试验避免了试验对象推断对手背叛会怎样。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: In one version of the experiment (the &ldquo;unlimited&rdquo; version), subjects were told that they could make promises not to defect, but they were also told that the anonymity of their responses would render such promises unenforceable.  In two other versions of the experiment (the &ldquo;intermediate&rdquo; and &ldquo;limited&rdquo; versions), subjects were not permitted to make promises about their strategies.  The latter two versions differed from one another in terms of the length of pre-game interaction, with up to 30 minutes permitted for the intermediate groups and no more than ten minutes for the limited groups.  All groups were given an extensive briefing on the prisoner's dilemma at the start of the experiment and each subject was required to complete a questionnaire at the end to verify that he or she had indeed understood the consequences of different combinations of choices.
zh_CN: 在一个游戏版本（&ldquo;无尽&rdquo; 版）中，我们告诉试验对象可以承诺不背叛，但是也告诉他们由于他们的操作是匿名的，所以承诺也没有效力。在另外两个游戏版本（&ldquo;中间&rdquo; 和 &ldquo;有限&rdquo; 版）中，游戏对象不允许承诺会作出某操作。后面两个游戏的区别是游戏中每次交互的时长，中间版允许的时长是最多 30 分钟，而有限版是 10 分钟。试验开始前，我们向每组对象详细解释了囚徒困境，而且我们讲完后向每个对象发放了问卷，验证他们确实理解了不同选择的结果。

note: type: Content of: <h6>
en: Results for the Sample as a Whole
zh_CN: 整个试验对象的总体结果

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: For the sample as a whole there were a total of 267 games, which means a total of 534 choices between cooperation and defection.  The choices for economics majors and nonmajors are shown in Figure 6, where we see that the defection rate for economics majors was 60.4 percent, as compared to only 38.8 percent for nonmajors.
zh_CN: 总共有 267 次游戏，这就是说一共有 534 合作或背叛的选择。经济学专业和非经济学专业的选择如图 6 所示，经济学专业的背叛率是 60.4%，而其他专业的背叛率是 38.8%。

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en: Figure 6
zh_CN: 图 6

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Figure 6. Defection and Cooperation Rates for the Sample as a Whole.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图 6. 整体背叛和合作率。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Needless to say, this pattern of differences is strongly supportive of the hypothesis that economics majors are more likely than nonmajors to behave self-interestedly (p&lt;.005).
zh_CN: 毋庸置疑，这个差异有力地支持了经济学专业比非经济学专业更为利己主义这个假说。（p&lt;.005）。

note: type: Content of: <h6>
en: Adding Control Variables
zh_CN: 增加控制变量

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Earlier we noted that one possible explanation for the observed differences between economics students and others is that economics students are more likely than others to be male.  To control for the possible influences of sex, age, and experimental condition, we performed the ordinary least squares regression reported in Table 2.  Because each subject played the game twice, the individual responses are not statistically independent.  To get around this problem, we limited our sample to the 207 subjects who either cooperated with, or defected on, each of their two partners.  The 60 subjects who cooperated with one partner and defected on the other were deleted from the sample.  The dependent variable is the subject's choice of strategy, coded as 0 for &ldquo;cooperate&rdquo; and 1 for &ldquo;defect.&rdquo; The independent variables are &ldquo;econ&rdquo; which takes the value 1 for economics majors, 0 for all others; &ldquo;unlimited,&rdquo; which is 1 for subjects in the unlimited version of the experiment, 0 for all others; &ldquo;intermediate,&rdquo; which is 1 for subjects in the intermediate version, 0 for all others; &ldquo;limited,&rdquo; which is the reference category; &ldquo;sex,&rdquo; coded as 1 for males, 0 for females; and &ldquo;class,&rdquo; coded as 1 for freshmen, 2 for sophomores, 3 for juniors, and 4 for seniors.
zh_CN: 前文已经讨论过，经济专业学生和其他专业学生表现差异的一个可能解释是经济学专业的学生更可能是男性。为了控制试验条件中性别、年龄等因素的可能影响，我们对表二进行了最小方差的回归。由于每位学生都进行了两次游戏，所以游戏中个人响应并非独立统计事件。为了消除这个问题，我们把样本限制在 207 个对象，他们要么是两次全合作，要么是两次全背叛。另外 60 个对象是一次合作、一次背叛，这些没有计入统计样本。因变量是试验对象的策略选择，我们用 0 表示 &ldquo;合作&rdquo;，用 1 表示 &ldquo;背叛&rdquo;。自变量是 &ldquo;econ&rdquo;，其中 1 表示经济学专业，0 表示其他；&ldquo;无限&rdquo;，其中 1 表示试验是无尽版，0 表示其他；&ldquo;中间&rdquo;，1 表示中间版，0 表示其他；&ldquo;有限&rdquo;，作为参考类别；&ldquo;性别&rdquo;，1 表示男性，0 表示女性；以及 &ldquo;班级&rdquo;，1 表示新生，2 二年级，3 三年级，4 四年级。

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: <strong>Dependent variable:own response</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>因变量：自我响应</strong>

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: R2 22.2% R2(adjusted) 20.3%
zh_CN: R2 22.2% R2（已调整） 20.3%

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: s 0.4402 with 207 - 6 201 degrees of freedom
zh_CN: s 0.4402 带有 207 - 6 201 自由度

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: <strong>SourceSum of SquaresdfMean SquareF-ratio</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>SourceSum of SquaresdfMean SquareF-比率</strong>

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: Regression11.142652.22911.5
zh_CN: 回归 11.142652.22911.5

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: Residual38.95402010.193801
zh_CN: 残值 38.95402010.193801

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: <strong>VariableCoefficients.e.t-ratio</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>VariableCoefficients.e.t-比率</strong>

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: Constant0.5791270.10415.57
zh_CN: 常数 0.5791270.10415.57

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: econ0.1688350.07802.16
zh_CN: 经济学 0.1688350.07802.16

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: unlimited0.00----
zh_CN: 无尽版 0.00----

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: intermediate-0.0911890.0806-1.13
zh_CN: 中间版 -0.0911890.0806-1.13

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: limited-0.3295720.0728-4.53
zh_CN: 有限版 -0.3295720.0728-4.53

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: sex0.2399440.06423.74
zh_CN: 性别 0.2399440.06423.74

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: class-0.0653630.0303-2.16
zh_CN: 班级 -0.0653630.0303-2.16

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: <strong>Table 2. Whole Sample Regression.</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>表 2. 全量回归。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Consistent with a variety of other findings on sex differences in cooperation, we estimate that, other factors the same, the probability of a male defecting is almost 0.24 higher than the corresponding probability for a female.  Even after controlling for the influence of gender, we see that the probability of an economics major defecting is almost 0.17 higher than the corresponding probability for a nonmajor.
zh_CN: 与很多其他关于性别在合作方面差异的研究一致，在其他因素一样的情况下，我们估计男性背叛的可能性差不多要比女性高 24%。即使考虑了性别影响，我们看到经济学专业的学生背叛的可能性还是几乎要比其他学生高 17%。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: The coefficients for the unlimited and intermediate experimental categories represent effects relative to the defection rate for the limited category.  As expected, the defection rate is smaller in the intermediate category (where subjects have more time to interact than in the limited category), and falls sharply further in the unlimited category (where subjects are permitted to make promises to cooperate).  With subjects' permission, we tape recorded the conversations of several of the unlimited groups, and invariably each person promised each of his partners he would cooperate.  (There would be little point, after all, in promising to defect.)
zh_CN: 无尽版和中间版的参数代表了相对于有限版的背叛率。正如我们所期待，中间版（测试对象比有限版有更多时间来互动）的背叛率更小，而无尽版（测试对象可以承诺合作）的背叛率快速下降。在征得测试对象的许可之后，我们对某些无尽版小组的对话进行了录音，毫无例外，每个小组成员对向对手承诺自己会合作。（毕竟，承诺背叛没有意义。）

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Note, finally, that the overall defection rate declines significantly as students progress through school.  The class coefficient is interpreted to mean that with the passage of each year the probability of defection declines, on the average, by almost 0.07.  This pattern will prove important when we take up the question of whether training in economics is the cause of higher defection rates for economics majors.
zh_CN: 请注意，最终，随着学生在学校度过时光，整体的背叛率显著下降。班级参数代表着每年背叛率都会下降，平均下降是 7%。当我们面临是否经济学训练是经济学专业学生高背叛率的原因这一问题时，这个现象就显得非常重要。

note: type: Content of: <h6>
en: The Unlimited Subsample
zh_CN: 无尽版样本

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Focusing on subjects in the unlimited subsample, we see in Figure 7 that the difference between economics majors and nonmajors virtually disappears once subjects are permitted to make promises to cooperate.  For this subsample, the defection rate for economics majors is 28.6 percent, for nonmajors 25.9 percent.
zh_CN: 单独查看无尽版样本时，我们从图 7 看出经济学和非经济学的差异在允许测试对象承诺合作后基本消失了。对该样本，经济学专业的背叛率是 28.6%，而非经济学专业的背叛率是 25.9%。

note: type: Attribute 'alt' of: <p><img>
en: Figure 7
zh_CN: 图 7

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Figure 7. The Unlimited Subsample (Promises Permitted).  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图 7. 无尽版样本（允许承诺）。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <h6>
en: The Intermediate and Limited Subsamples
zh_CN: 中间版和有限版样本

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Because the higher defection rates for economics majors are largely attributable to the no-promises conditions of the experiment, the remainder of our analysis focuses on subjects in the limited and intermediate groups.  The conditions encountered by these groups are of special significance because they come closest to approximating the conditions that characterize social dilemmas encountered in practice.  After all, people rarely have an opportunity to look one another in the eye and promise not to litter on deserted beaches or disconnect the smog control devices on their cars.
zh_CN: 由于非承诺版本的试验构成经济学专业学生具有较高背叛率的大部分，我们后面的分析重点就放在有限版和中间版的试验对象上。因为这些试验组遇到的情形非常接近实际社会上遇到的困境，所以他们很有意义。总体来说，人们很少有机会互相看着眼睛，然后保证不会在无人的海滩上丢垃圾或者拔掉车上的尾气净化器。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: In Figure 8 we report the choices for the pooled limited and intermediate groups.  Comparing the entries in Figure 8 with Figure 7, we see clear evidence of the higher defection rates of both economics majors and nonmajors.  The defection rates of 71.8 percent and 47.3 percent for economics majors and nonmajors, respectively, differ significantly from one another at the .01 level.
zh_CN: 在图 8，我们汇报了限制版和中间版群组的选择。比较图 8 和图 7，我们清楚地看到经济学专业和非经济学专业都有较高的背叛率。他们分别是 71.8% 和 47.3%，差别非常明显。

note: type: Attribute 'alt' of: <p><img>
en: Figure 8
zh_CN: 图 8

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Figure 8. Defection and Cooperation Rates for the No-Promises Subsample.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图 8. 非承诺组的背叛率和合作率。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <h6>
en: Reasons for Cooperation and Defection
zh_CN: 合作与背叛的原因

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: As part of the exit questionnaire that tested our subjects' understanding of the payoffs associated with different combinations of choices, we also asked them to state their reasons for making the choices they did.  We hypothesized that economists would be more inclined to construe the objective of the game in self-interested terms, and therefore more likely to refer exclusively to features of the game itself when describing reasons for their choices.  By contrast, we expected the noneconomists to be more open to alternative ways of interpreting the game, and thus more likely to look to their partners for cues about how to play.  Accordingly, we expected noneconomists to refer more often to their feelings about their partners, aspects of human nature, and so on.  This is precisely the pattern we found.  Among the sample of economics students, 31% made exclusive reference to features of the game itself in explaining their chosen strategies, as compared with only 17% of the noneconomists.  The probability of obtaining such divergent responses by chance is less than .05.
zh_CN: 作为最后结束的问卷部分，我们测试了试验对象对不同选择的回报的理解，我们也要求他们叙述他们作出选择的理由。我们的理论是经济学专业的学生更倾向于把游戏的目标用利己主义的术语来描述，因此更可能专门使用游戏本身的功能来说明自己作出选择的原因。与之相反，我们预期非经济学专业的学生会更开放地解读游戏，因此更可能通过观察伙伴来作出决定。相应地，我们预期非经济学专业的学生更多的描述对伙伴的感觉、人性等等。这正是我们发现的模式。在经济学专业的样本中，31% 专门使用了游戏本身的功能来解释他们的策略，而非经济学专业的样本中只有 17%。这个差异的随机可能性低于 5%。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Another possible explanation for the economists' higher defection rates is that economists may be more likely than others to expect their partners to defect.  The self-interest model, after all, encourages such an expectation, and we know from other experiments that most subjects defect if they are told that their partners are going to defect.  To investigate the role of expectations, we asked students in an upper division public finance course in Cornell's economics department whether they would cooperate or defect in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma if they knew <i>with certainty</i> that their partner was going to cooperate.  Most of these students were economics majors in their junior and senior years.  Of the 31 students returning our questionnaires, 18 (58 percent) reported that they would defect, only 13 that they would cooperate.  By contrast, just 34 percent (14 of 41) noneconomics Cornell undergraduates who were given the same questionnaire reported that they would defect on a partner they knew would cooperate (p&lt;.05).  For the same two groups of subjects, almost all respondents (30 of 31 economics students and 36 of 41 noneconomics students) said they would defect if they knew their partner would defect.  From these responses, we conclude that while expectations of partner performance do indeed play a strong role in predicting behavior, defection rates would remain significantly higher for economists than for noneconomists even if both groups held identical expectations about partner performance.
zh_CN: 经济学专业具有较高背叛率的另一个可能的解释是经济学专业的学生可能更倾向于认为伙伴会背叛。毕竟，利己主义模型会鼓励这种预期，而且我们从其他试验已经知道如果被告知伙伴会背叛，那么大多数试验对象会背叛。为了研究预期的作用，我们询问了康奈尔大学经济系公共财务课的高年级学生，问如果他们<i>确信</i>伙伴将合作时，他们在一站式囚徒困境游戏中是合作还是背叛。大多数学生是三、四年级经济专业的学生。在 31 份收回的问卷中，18 份（58%）报告会背叛，只有 13 份表示会合作。与之相反，只有 34%（41 份中的 14份）非经济系的康奈尔大学生在回答同样的问卷时选择了背叛 (p&lt;.05)。对同样两组对象，几乎所有回复者（经济系 31 个中的 30个，非经济系 41 个中的 36 个）表示如果知道伙伴会背叛，他们也会背叛。通过这个调查，我们得出的结论是虽然伙伴的表现有很重要的预测价值，但是在对伙伴的预期一致的条件下，经济系学生还是要比非经济学学生保有高得多的背叛率。

note: type: Content of: <h4>
en: II. Why Do Economists Behave Differently?
zh_CN: II. 为什么经济学家的表现会不一样？

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: In the preceding sections we have seen evidence that economists behave less cooperatively than noneconomists along a variety of different dimensions.  This difference in behavior might be exclusively the result of training in economics.  Alternatively, it might exist simply because people who chose to major in economics were different initially.  Or it might be some combination of these two effects.  We now report evidence on whether training in economics plays a causal role.
zh_CN: 在前面的章节中我们看到很多证据表明经济学家在多个维度都表现得更不合作。这种不同有可能只是经济学训练的结果。另外，这种不同也可能仅仅是由于选择学经济的人本来就是这样。或者也有可能是两者的组合效应。现在，我们看下经济学训练是否充当了重要的角色。

note: type: Content of: <h5>
en: A. Comparing Upperclassmen and Underclassmen
zh_CN: A. 高年级和低年级的比较

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: If economics training plays a causal role in uncooperative behavior, then we would expect defection rates in the prisoner's dilemma experiments to rise with exposure to training in economics.  Again focusing on the no-promises subsample, the defection rates are broken down by major and level of education in Figure 9.  As shown, the defection rate for economics majors is virtually the same for both upperclassmen (juniors and seniors) and underclassmen (freshmen and sophomores).  By contrast, the defection rate for nonmajors is approximately 33 percent higher for underclassmen than for upperclassmen.
zh_CN: 如果经济学训练在合作行为上起着关键作用，那么我们期望训练越多在囚徒困境中的背叛率越高。同样，我们还是看非承诺的样本，图 9 展示了按专业和年级分的背叛率。可以看到，经济学专业的背叛率在高年级（三四年级）和低年级（一二年级）学生中基本没有区别。与之相反，非经济学专业低年级的背叛率比高年级的背叛率高了差不多 33%。

note: type: Attribute 'alt' of: <p><img>
en: Figure 9
zh_CN: 图 9

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Figure 9. Defection Rates for Upper- and Underclassmen.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图 9. 高年级和低年级的背叛率。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: The pattern shown in Figure 9 continues to hold when we control for the effects of other factors that influence defection rates.  As the regression equation summarized in Table 3 shows, the defection probabilities do not differ significantly between upperclass economics majors and underclass economics majors.  For nonmajors, defection probabilities are sharply lower than for majors in each category, and fall by more than 0.16 with the transition to upperclass status.
zh_CN: 图 9 展示的模式在排除了其他影响背叛率的因素之后还是一样的。正如回归公式在表 3 中总结的一样，经济学专业高年级和低年级的背叛率没有明显差别。而非经济学专业，每个专业高年级的背叛率都显著降低，下降超过 16%。

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: <strong>Dependent variable:own response </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>因变量：自我回复</strong>

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: R2 16.4%% R2(adjusted) 12.8%
zh_CN: R2 16.4%% R2(已调整) 12.8%

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: s 0.4673 with 124 - 6 118 degrees of freedom
zh_CN: s 0.4673 带有 124 - 6 118 自由度

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: Regression5.0359951.00724.61
zh_CN: 回归 5.0359951.00724.61

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: Residual25.76241180.218325
zh_CN: 残值 25.76241180.218325

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: Constant0.6287340.1436 4.38
zh_CN: 常数 0.6287340.1436 4.38

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: limited0.00----
zh_CN: 有限版 0.00----

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: intermediate-0.0950400.0876-1.09
zh_CN: 中间版 -0.0950400.0876-1.09

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: sex0.2575380.08962.88
zh_CN: 性别 0.2575380.08962.88

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: econ 1,20.00----
zh_CN: 经济学 1,20.00----

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: econ 3,4-0.0269360.1623 -0.166
zh_CN: 经济学 3,4-0.0269360.1623 -0.166

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: nonecon 1,2-0.1510500.1426-1.06
zh_CN: 非经济学 1,2-0.1510500.1426-1.06

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: nonecon 3,4-0.3132660.1427-2.20
zh_CN: 非经济学 3,4-0.3132660.1427-2.20

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: <strong>Table 3. The Effect of Education Level on Defection Rates.</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>表 3. 年级和背叛率的效应。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Thus, for students in general there is a pronounced tendency toward more cooperative behavior with movement toward graduation, a trend that is conspicuously absent for economics majors.  On the basis of the available evidence, we are in no position to say whether the trend for noneconomists reflects something about the content of noneconomics courses.  But regardless of the causes of this trend, the fact that it is not present for economists is consistent with the hypothesis that training in economics plays at least some causal role in the lower observed cooperation rates of economists.
zh_CN: 因此，一般对学生来说，当他们越接近毕业应该越明显地有合作的倾向，而这一倾向很显著地在经济学专业的学生中消失了。就已知的证据来看，我们不能说非经济学专业的课程有什么影响。但是不管是什么原因，合作倾向没有在经济学专业中随着年级增加而提高这一事实和我们假想的经济学训练影响合作至少有一定的关系。

note: type: Content of: <h5>
en: B. Honesty Surveys
zh_CN: B. 诚信调查

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: In a further attempt to assess whether training in economics inhibits cooperation in social dilemmas, we posed a pair of ethical dilemmas to students in two introductory microeconomics courses at Cornell University and to a control group of students in an introductory astronomy course, also at Cornell.  In one dilemma, the owner of a small business is shipped ten microcomputers but is billed for only nine and the question is whether the owner will inform the computer company of the error.  Subjects are first asked to estimate the chances (0 - 100%) that the owner would point out the mistake, and then, on the same response scale, to indicate how likely <i>they</i> would be to point out the error if they were the owner.  The second dilemma concerns whether a lost envelope containing $100 and bearing the owner's name and address is likely to be returned by the person who finds it.  Subjects are first asked to imagine that they have lost the envelope and to estimate the likelihood that a stranger would return it.  They are then asked to assume that the roles are reversed and to indicate the chances that they would return the money to a stranger.
zh_CN: 为了进一步评估经济学训练是否抑制社交困境的合作，我们向两组学生展示了两个道德困境。两组学生都来自康奈尔大学，其中一组学习两门微观经济学简介的课程，另一组是学习天文学简介的对照组。在一个困境中，一个小企业主定了 9 台电脑，但是收到 10 台。问题是该企业主是否应该告知电脑公司这个错误。试验对象首先被问道，估计企业主指出错误的概率（0 - 100%）；然后再回答，如果<i>他们</i>是该企业主，那么他们指出错误的概率。在另一个困境中，一个装有 $100 的信封丢了，上面写着姓名和地址。试验对象首先被问道，如果他们丢了信封，那么估计一下陌生人会交回信封的概率；然后交换一下角色，换成他们是陌生人，回答他们交回信封的概率是多大。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Students in each class completed the questionnaire on two occasions, first during the initial week of class in September, and then during the final week of class in December.
zh_CN: 每个班的学生都要两次回答这些问卷，第一次是 9 月份课程开始的第一周，第二次是 12 月课程结束的最后一周。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: For each of the four questions, each student was coded as being &ldquo;more honest&rdquo; if the probability checked for that question rose between September and December; &ldquo;less honest&rdquo; if it fell during that period; and &ldquo;no change&rdquo; if it remained the same.  Our hypothesis was that even a single semester of introductory microeconomics would have a measurable effect both on students' expectations of the level of self-interested behavior in society and on their own propensities to behave self-interestedly.
zh_CN: 针对四个问题的每个回答，每个学生会被标记为 &ldquo;更诚实&rdquo;——如果该学生在 12 月回答的概率高于 9 月回答的概率；&ldquo;更不诚实&rdquo;——如果概率降低；&ldquo;不变&rdquo;——如果概率一样。我们的理论是即使一个学期的微观经济学简介课程也会对学生的社会利己主义预期和自我利己主义表现产生可观测的影响。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: The first introductory microeconomics instructor (instructor A)  whose students we surveyed is a mainstream economist with research interests in industrial organization and game theory.  In class lectures, this instructor placed heavy emphasis on the prisoner's dilemma and related illustrations of how survival imperatives often militate against cooperation.  The second microeconomics instructor (instructor B) is a specialist in economic development in Maoist China who did not emphasize such material to the same degree, but did assign a mainstream introductory text.  On the basis of these differences, our expectation was that any observed effects of economics training should be stronger in instructor A's class than in instructor B's.  The results for the three classes are summarized in Figures 10-12.
zh_CN: 第一组被调查学生的微观经济学讲师（A）是一个主流的经济学家，研究工业组织和游戏理论。在课程中，该讲师强调囚徒困境及其对生存压力如何阻碍合作的相关诠释。第二组学生的微观经济学讲师（B）是研究中国毛时代经济学的专家，并不强调 A 的材料，不过也布置了主流经济学的介绍。基于这些不同，我们预期 A 班同学的经济学效应要比 B 班更强。三个班的结果显示在图 10-12 中。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Introductory Microeconomics A (N 48)</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>微观经济学简介 A 班 (N 48)</strong>

note: type: Attribute 'alt' of: <p><img>
en: Figure 10
zh_CN: 图 10

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Figure 10. Questionnaire Findings, Introductory Microeconomics A.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图 10. 问卷结果，微观经济学 A 班。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Introductory Microeconomics B (N 115)</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>微观经济学简介 B 班 (N 115)</strong>

note: type: Attribute 'alt' of: <p><img>
en: Figure 11
zh_CN: 图 11

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Figure 10. Questionnaire Findings, Introductory Microeconomics B.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图 11. 问卷结果，微观经济学 B 班。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Introduction to Astronomy (N 30)</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>天文学简介班 (N 30)</strong>

note: type: Attribute 'alt' of: <p><img>
en: Figure 12
zh_CN: 图 12

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Figure 12. Questionnaire Findings: Introduction to Astronomy.  </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>图 12. 问卷结果，天文学班。</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: As Figures 10 and 11 indicate, a tendency toward more cynical responses was observed in instructor A's introductory economics class but not in instructor B's.  In our control group of introductory astronomy students (Figure 12), there was a weak tendency toward less cynical expectations and behavior over the course of the semester.
zh_CN: 如图 10 和 11 所示，讲师 A 班级同学的反馈更有反常识的倾向，而讲师 B 班级的同学则没有。而作为对照组的天文学简介学生（图 12)随着学期的进步则有微弱倾向作出不那么反常识的期望和行为。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: It may seem natural to wonder whether the differences reflected in Figures 10 and 11 might stem in part from the fact that students chose their instructors rather than being randomly assigned.  Perhaps the ideological reputations of the two professors were known in advance to many students, with the result that a disproportionate number of the least cynical students chose to take instructor B's course.  Two observations, however, weigh heavily against this interpretation.  First, the average values of the initial responses to the four questions were in fact virtually the same for both classes.  And second, note that Figures 10 and 11 record not the <i>level</i> of cynicism but the <i>change</i> in that level between the beginning and end of the course.  Figure 11 thus tells us that even if the students in Microeconomics A were more cynical to begin with, they became still more so during the course of the semester.  This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that emphasis on the self-interest model tends to inhibit cooperation.
zh_CN: 人们会很自然地考虑图 10 和 11 的不同也许是部分归因于学生自主选择讲师而不是随机分配的讲师。两位讲师的意识形态或许早为众多学生所知，并导致选择讲师 B 的学生中最不反常识的人数比例不正常。不过，有两个结果严重与此矛盾。第一，事实上对四个问题最初回答的平均值在两个班里几乎一样。第二，请注意图 10 和 11 记录的不是反常识的 <i>级别</i>，而是反常识级别在课程开始和结束时的 <i>变化</i>。因此，图 11 告诉我们的是，即使 A 班的同学开始时更反常识，他们在学期之后还要更反常识。这个发现和我们的假设一致：利己主义模型倾向于限制合作。

note: type: Content of: <h3>
en: Discussion
zh_CN: 讨论

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: There have been several previous attempts to discover whether economists behave in more self-interested ways than do noneconomists.  The Marwell and Ames finding of a greater tendency to free ride on the part of economists is uncertain because their samples of economists and noneconomists were different on so many dimensions other than academic history and interests.  The Carter and Irons findings on the ultimatum bargaining game were subject to an alternative interpretation based on the possibility that economics majors may have held different views on how performance in the preliminary word game affected entitlements in the ultimatum game.
zh_CN: 此前有多个研究试图揭示经济学家是否比非经济学家表现得更利己。Marwell 和 Ames 在搭便车研究中发现的经济学家更有倾向性的结果具有不确定性，因为他们的经济学家样本和非经济学家样本在除了学术和兴趣之外的多个维度都不同。Carter 和 Irons 在最后通牒游戏中的发现可以有另外的解释：经济学专业的学生可能对在初选拼字游戏中的表现如何影响最后通牒游戏的结果抱有不同的观点。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: We believe our prisoner's dilemma results constitute the clearest demonstration to date of a large difference in the extent to which economists and noneconomists behave self-interestedly.  And our survey of charitable giving lends additional support to the hypothesis that economists are more likely than others to free ride.
zh_CN: 我们相信我们的囚徒困境游戏之结果是对经济学家和非经济学家的利己主义行为非常不同的最清楚的展现。而且我们关于慈善捐助的调研是对经济学家更可能搭便车这一假设的额外支持。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: But we also emphasize that both of these exercises produced evidence that economists behave in traditionally communitarian ways under at least some circumstances.  For example, they reported spending as much time as others in volunteer activities, and their total gifts to charity were only slightly less than would have been expected on the basis of their incomes.  Finally, in the unlimited version of our prisoner's dilemma experiments, where subjects were allowed to promise to cooperate, economists were almost as likely to cooperate as noneconomists were.
zh_CN: 但是我们也要强调，以上两个试验也为至少在某些情况下经济学家会表现得像传统社群主义者那样提供了证据。比如，他们报告的志愿活动时间投入和其他类别的人一致，他们的总慈善捐助额，根据收入来说，仅仅略少于其他类别。最后，在囚徒困境游戏的无尽版中，试验对象可以承诺合作，经济学家的合作程度也几乎和非经济学家一样。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: We also found evidence consistent with the view that the differences in cooperativeness are caused in part by training in economics.  First, we saw that the gap in defection rates between economics majors and nonmajors tends to widen as students move toward graduation.  Second, we saw that introductory microeconomics, at least if taught in a certain way, seems to affect student attitudes toward honesty.
zh_CN: 我们还发现支持经济学训练是导致合作差异的部分原因的证据。第一，我们看到经济学和非经济学学生背叛率的差异随着年级增高而变大。第二，我们看到微观经济学简介，至少按照某种方式教授，看来会影响学生对诚实的态度。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Clearly, our evidence for the existence of a difference between the behavior of economists and noneconomists is more compelling than our evidence for the causal role of economics training in creating that difference.  But there is additional indirect evidence for such a role.  One of the clearest patterns to emerge in several decades of experimental research on the prisoner's dilemma is that the behavior of any given player is strongly influenced by that player's prediction about what his partner will do.  In experiments involving noneconomists, people who expect their partners to cooperate usually cooperate themselves, and those who expect their partners to defect almost always defect.  In our experiments, economists were 42 percent more likely than noneconomists to predict that their partners would defect.  It would be remarkable indeed if none of this difference in outlook were the result of repeated exposure to a behavioral model whose unequivocal prediction is that people will defect whenever self-interest dictates.
zh_CN: 很明确，经济学家和非经济学家的行为存在不同的证据要强于经济学训练产生不同的证据。但是对经济学训练的作用还有一些其他证据。囚徒困境游戏数十年的实验研究展示的一个最明确的模式就是，游戏一方的行为会非常大地受到此一方对另一方行为预测的影响。在非经济学家的试验里，人们期待另一方会合作的话，通常也会合作；而人们期待另一方会背叛的话，几乎总是也背叛。在我们的试验中，经济学家比非经济学家期待对手会背叛的可能性要高 42%。如果这个不同一点也不是因为被反复灌输一种以毫不含糊的口吻预测人们总是会背叛的行为模型的话，那么它真是太惊人了。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: For the sake of discussion, suppose that exposure to the self-interest model does, in fact, cause people to behave more selfishly.  Should this be a cause for concern? To the extent that norms favoring cooperation help solve prisoner's dilemmas and other market failures, one cost of a rise in selfish behavior is a fall in the real value of economic output.  Who bears this cost? By conventional accounts, it is those who continue to behave cooperatively, a troubling outcome on equity grounds.  Several researchers have recently suggested, however, that the ultimate victims of noncooperative behavior may be the very people who practice it.  Suppose, for example, that some people always cooperate in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas while others always follow the seemingly dominant strategy of defecting.  If people are free to interact with others of their own choosing, and if there are cues that distinguish cooperators from defectors, then cooperators will interact selectively with one another and earn higher payoffs than defectors.  Elsewhere we have shown that even on the basis of brief encounters involving strangers, experimental subjects are adept at predicting who will cooperate and who will defect in prisoner's dilemma games.  If people are even better at predicting the behavior of people they know well, it seems that the direct pursuit of material self-interest may indeed often be self-defeating.
zh_CN: 为了讨论的关系，假设利己主义模型确实导致人们的行为更加自私。那么这个原因值得担心吗？如果常理倾向于合作会消解囚徒困境和其他市场失败的问题，那么自私行为增加带来的成本就是经济产出实际价值的降低。谁来承担这个成本呢？按传统财务来说，谁一直合作谁就承担这个成本，这是资产的不良输出。不过，最近有多个学者建议，不合作行为的最终受害者可能是实施这些行为的人。比如，我们假设在一站式囚徒困境游戏中部分人总是合作，而另外的人总是实施看似主流的背叛策略。如果人们可以自由选择游戏对象，而如果人们可以分辨合作者和背叛者，那么合作者会找到合作者来游戏并获得比背叛者更高的收益。我们也展示了即使是以包括陌生人的简单沟通为基础的会面中，囚徒困境游戏的试验对象也很擅长预测谁会合作及谁会背叛。如果人们对预测熟人的行为更擅长，那么看来直接追求物质的利己主义实际上是搬起石头砸自己的脚。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: These observations do not challenge the obvious importance of self-interest as a human motive.  But they do suggest the need for a richer model of 20human behavior, one that explicitly recognizes that people who hold cooperative motives often come out ahead.
zh_CN: 这些观察结果并不是在挑战利己主义作为人类发展动力的显而易见的重要性。但是，它们确实建议我们需要一个更加丰富的人类行为模型，这个模型需要明确认可具有合作动机的人经常会胜出。

note: type: Content of: <h3>
en: References
zh_CN: 参考文献

note: type: Content of: <h3>
en: Appendix 1: Whole Sample Probit and Logit Models
zh_CN: 附录 1：整体抽样的概率模型

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Probit Model:</strong> Pr[own response 1 | X] F(X<code>b</code>), where F is the std. normal c.d.f.
zh_CN: <strong>概率模型：</strong> Pr[own response 1 | X] F(X<code>b</code>)，其中 F 是标准正态 c.d.f.

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Observations: 207 Cases Correct: 150
zh_CN: 观察量：207 个，正确：150

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Log Likelihood: -114.96953 Avg. Likelihood: .57383787
zh_CN: Log 概率：-114.96953，平均概率：.57383787

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Variable Coefficients.e. t-ratio</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>可变参数 s.e.t-ratio</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: constant .2546171 .3195718 .7967445
zh_CN: 常数 .2546171 .3195718 .7967445

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: unlimited -1.002759 .2312719 -4.335844
zh_CN: 无尽版 -1.002759 .2312719 -4.335844

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: intermediate-.2769906 .2439911 -1.135249
zh_CN: 中间版 -.2769906 .2439911 -1.135249

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: limited 0.00------
zh_CN: 有限版 0.00------

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: class -.2005716 0.09523010-2.106178
zh_CN: 班级 -.2005716 0.09523010-2.106178

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: sex.7184583 .1988373 3.613298
zh_CN: 性别 .7184583 .1988373 3.613298

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: econ .4831544 .24106652.004237
zh_CN: 经济学 .4831544 .24106652.004237

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Logit Model:</strong> Pr[own response 1 | X] exp(X<code>b</code>)/(1+exp(X<code>b</code>))
zh_CN: <strong>Logit 模型：</strong> Pr[own response 1 | X] exp(X<code>b</code>)/(1+exp(X<code>b</code>))

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Log Likelihood: -114.82229 Avg. Likelihood: .57424621
zh_CN: Log 概率：-114.82229，平均概率：.57424621

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Variable Coefficient s.e.t-ratio </strong>
zh_CN: <strong>可变参数 s.e.t-ratio </strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: constant .4646459 .5381353 .8634368
zh_CN: 常数 .4646459 .5381353 .8634368

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: unlimited-1.696657 .3991972 -4.250174
zh_CN: 无尽版 -1.696657 .3991972 -4.250174

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: intermediate-.4859651 .4060518 -1.196806
zh_CN: 中间版 -.4859651 .4060518 -1.196806

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: class-.3469820 .1628891 -2.130173
zh_CN: 班级 -.3469820 .1628891 -2.130173

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: sex1.196511 .33479733.573837
zh_CN: 性别 .196511 .33479733.573837

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: econ .8411330.4056866 2.073357
zh_CN: 经济 .8411330.4056866 2.073357

note: type: Content of: <h3>
en: Appendix 2: Ethics Questionnaire
zh_CN: 附录 2：道德问卷

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: This questionnaire is part of an ongoing study of attitudes toward ethical issues that arise in business and personal life.  Please read each question carefully and try to imagine yourself in the situation it describes.  Then check the most appropriate response category for each question.
zh_CN: 本调查问卷是尚在进行中的研究的一部分。该研究针对的是人们对商业和个人生活中出现的道德问题的态度。请认真阅读每个问题并尽量想象自己身处问题所描述的场景。然后再选择最适合的回答。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Question #1.</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>问题 #1.</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: In an effort to increase productivity, the owner of a small business has ordered ten personal computers for use by his staff.  When the UPS shipment arrives, he notices that the invoice from the mail-order house bills for only nine PCs, even though all ten were included with the shipment.
zh_CN: 为了提高生产效率，一个小企业主为员工订购了一批个人电脑。当 UPS 把货送到后，他发现邮寄公司的发票只有 9 台电脑的金额，不过送到的货物是 10 台。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: The owner has two options. (1) He can inform the mail-order house of its error and ask to be billed for the correct amount; or (2) he can pay the amount shown on the invoice and take no further action.
zh_CN: 企业主有两个选择。(1) 他可以向邮寄公司指出错误并要求正确的发票；(2) 他直接按现在的发票付款并不再关注此事。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: If the owner pays the amount shown, the worst thing that can happen is that the mail-order house may later discover its error and bill him for the tenth computer.  There is a high probability (0.99, say) that the error will never be discovered.
zh_CN: 如果企业主选择 (2)，最坏的情况是邮寄公司后来发现错误并向他收第 10 台电脑的钱。更可能的是 (99% 的概率) 没人发现这个错误。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: What do you believe the chances are that the owner will inform the mail-order house of its mistake and ask to be billed for the correct amount? (Check one.)
zh_CN: 在你看来，企业主向邮寄公司指出错误并要求改正的概率有多大？（请选择一个。）

note: type: Attribute 'alt' of: <p><img>
en: Response grid
zh_CN: 答题线

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Question #2.</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>问题 #2.</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: If YOU were the owner in the situation described in Question #1, what are the chances you would inform the mail-order house of its mistake and ask to be billed for the correct amount? (Check one.)
zh_CN: 如果你就是问题 #1 中的小企业主，那么你向邮寄公司指出错误并要求改正的概率有多大？（请选择一个。）

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: _____________________________________________________________(Please turn over)
zh_CN: _____________________________________________________________(请翻页)

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Question #3.</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>问题 #3.</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: After attending a football game, you return home to discover that you have lost an envelope from your jacket pocket.  The envelope contains $100 in cash and has your name and address written on the outside.  A stranger has found the envelope.
zh_CN: 在参加了一场足球比赛之后，你发现你把放在口袋里的一个信封丢了。这个信封里有 $100 现金，信封外面写了你的名字和地址。有个陌生人捡到了这个信封。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: What would you say the chances are that this person will return your $100 to you? (Check one.)
zh_CN: 你觉得这个陌生人把钱还给你的概率有多大？(请选择一个。)

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Question #4.</strong>
zh_CN: <strong>问题 #4.</strong>

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: If YOU found $100 in an envelope like the one described in Question #3, what are the chances that you would return the stranger's cash? (Check one.)
zh_CN: 如果你是问题 #3 中那个捡到钱的人，那么你把钱还给陌生人的概率有多大？(请选择一个。)

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: For each of the following, please check the category that applies to you:
zh_CN: 以下各项，请选择适合你自己的那个：

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Sex:</strong> male_____________female____________
zh_CN: <strong>性别：</strong> 男_____________女____________

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: <strong>Class:</strong> freshman________ sophomore__________
zh_CN: <strong>年级：</strong> 一年级________ 二年级__________

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: junior___________senior_____________other _____________
zh_CN: 三年级___________四年级_____________其他 _____________

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: There will be a followup to this questionnaire in December.  In order to match the followup questionnaire with this one, we need an identifying code for each of you, one that preserves your anonymity and that you will be able to recall easily in December.  Past experience has taught that a code with these properties can be made from your middle name and your mother's maiden name.
zh_CN: 在 12 月，我们还会在跟踪次问卷调查。为了匹配两次问卷，我们需要你们的身份代码。这个代码让你保持匿名，又让你在下次问卷时还记得起来。过去的经验是使用你的中间名和你母亲的婚前名做组合比较容易。

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Your middle name_____________________________________
zh_CN: 你的中间名_____________________________________

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Your mother's maiden name______________________________
zh_CN: 你母亲的婚前名______________________________

note: type: Content of: <p>
en: Thank you very much for your cooperation.
zh_CN: 感谢你的合作。

note: type: Content of: <div><div><p>
en: Please send general FSF &amp; GNU inquiries to <a href="mailto:gnu@gnu.org">&lt;gnu@gnu.org&gt;</a>.  There are also <a href="/contact/">other ways to contact</a> the FSF.  Broken links and other corrections or suggestions can be sent to <a href="mailto:webmasters@gnu.org">&lt;webmasters@gnu.org&gt;</a>.
zh_CN: 请将对FSF&amp;GNU的一般询问发送到<a href="mailto:gnu@gnu.org">&lt;gnu@gnu.org&gt;</a>。还有一些其他联系FSF的<a href="/contact/">方式</a>。关于链接错误和&rdquo;其他更正或建议&ldquo;请发信到<a href="mailto:web-translators@gnu.org">&lt;web-translators@gnu.org&gt;</a>。

note: TRANSLATORS: Ignore the original text in this paragraph, replace it with the translation of these two: We work hard and do our best to provide accurate, good quality translations.  However, we are not exempt from imperfection. Please send your comments and general suggestions in this regard to <a hr
en: Please see the <a href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations README</a> for information on coordinating and submitting translations of this article.
zh_CN: 我们尽最大努力来提供精准和高质量的翻译，但难免会存在错误和不足。如果您在这方面有评论或一般性的建议，请发送至 <a href="mailto:web-translators@gnu.org">&lt;web-translators@gnu.org&gt;</a>。</p><p>关于进行协调与提交翻译的更多信息参见 <a href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">《译者指南》</a>。

note: type: Content of: <div><p>
en: This page is licensed under a <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License</a>.
zh_CN: 本页面使用 <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License</a> 授权。

note: TRANSLATORS: Use space (SPC) as msgstr if you don't want credits. type: Content of: <div><div>
en: *GNUN-SLOT: TRANSLATOR'S CREDITS*
zh_CN: <b>翻译团队</b>：<a rel="team" href="//savannah.gnu.org/projects/www-zh-cn/">&lt;CTT&gt;</a>，2023。

note: timestamp start type: Content of: <div><p>
en: Updated:
zh_CN: 最后更新：
